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I. INTRODUCTION
Antitrust cases frequently involve a determination as to whether
the defendant has, or is likely to obtain, monopoly power or market
power in some relevant market.1 It is therefore critically important for
parties and courts to begin their legal analyses by accurately defining
the relevant market in question. This line of inquiry is expressly indicated by the federal antitrust statutes, which condemn monopolization
of “any part of . . . trade or commerce”2 and mergers that tend to
lessen competition “in any line of commerce in any section of the
country.”3 A properly defined relevant market is necessary to calculate a firm’s market share for the purpose of inferring individual market power.4 Also, the analysis of conduct under the rule of reason5
ordinarily calls for the definition of a market in which the conduct
may or may not be found to have unreasonable anticompetitive ef1. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) (“Monopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude competition.”); see also Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992) (“[Market power is]
the ability . . . to raise price and restrict output.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). For a
comprehensive discussion of the relationship between the market definition and market
power inquiries, see 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ch. 5 (vol. IIA 1995).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
4. AREEDA, supra note 1, ¶¶ 531c–d, at 157–58.
5. Most antitrust scrutiny is conducted under the “rule of reason,” whereby the court must
determine whether the practice in question constitutes an unreasonable restraint on competition under all the circumstances of the case. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y,
457 U.S. 332, 342–43 (1982). Certain practices, however, are condemned as per se violations of the antitrust laws, meaning that they “are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the
business excuse for their use.” N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958).
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fects.6 Accordingly, market definition has become an integral part of
common-law doctrines relating to such diverse conduct as monopolization,7 mergers,8 tying,9 exclusive dealing,10 territorial and customer
restrictions,11 and non-price horizontal restraints.12 In sum, “the most
important single issue in most [antitrust] enforcement actions — because so much depends on it — is market definition.”13
The task of defining a relevant market “is as difficult an undertaking as any in antitrust,”14 even when the products under consideration
6. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 495 (4th ed.
1997) (“Ascertaining the restraint’s competitive effects [under the rule of reason] ordinarily
requires a definition of the relevant market and an analysis of the restraint’s effect on competition within that market . . . .” (citation omitted)); Phillip E. Areeda, The Rule of Reason:
A Catechism on Competition, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 576–77 (1986) (noting that market
definition is the usual approach to assessing the potential for anticompetitive effects, but
that such an approach is “superfluous if we have already observed adverse effects”); see
also Thomas E. Kauper, The Problem of Market Definition Under EC Competition Law, 20
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1682, 1685 (1997) (“Market definition is now an essential element in a
broad range of U.S. cases. Indeed, one can plausibly argue that it is necessary in all but
cartel and resale price maintenance cases.”).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (“The offense
of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident.”).
8. See, e.g., FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining that
the government establishes a presumption of anticompetitive effect by showing that a
merger “would produce a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market,
and [would] result[ ] in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market.”
(internal quotation omitted)).
9. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 20–21 (1984) (“[A]
tying arrangement cannot exist unless two separate product markets have been linked.”).
10. See, e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961) (stating
that “the line of commerce” (i.e., the product market) and “the area of effective competition” (i.e., the geographic market) must be delineated in order to determine whether an
exclusive dealing arrangement will foreclose “competition . . . in a substantial share of the
line of commerce affected” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
11. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, at 154–55 n.852 (4th ed. 1997)
(“Courts [reviewing territorial and customer restrictions under the rule of reason] typically
require plaintiffs to show that a supplier has sufficient market power to affect competition in
the relevant market.”).
12. See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 217
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (defining a nationwide market for the interstate carriage of used household
goods in order to “analyze the economic nature and effects of the system [of non-price
horizontal restraints] Atlas has created”).
13. Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1807 (1990).
14. MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 215 (3d ed.
1990); see also U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 598 (1st Cir.
1993) (“There is no subject in antitrust law more confusing than market definition.”).
Evaluating the practical problems of defining a market for a particular case, Luanne Sacks
and Garrett Dillon observe that:
If in fact the settlements fail, and the district court is faced with remand of the tying claim, it will be faced with a technically onerous
product analyses, confused by self-serving, yet possibly meritorious,
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are well understood; it may well be hopeless when the products are
poorly understood.15 In United States v. Microsoft Corp., the district
court issued separate findings of fact16 and conclusions of law17 holding Microsoft liable for tying under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.18
The court of appeals upheld the findings of fact in their entirety,19 but
criticized the government’s failure to explain “what constitutes a
browser (i.e., what are the technological components of or functionalities provided by a browser) and . . . why certain other products are
not reasonable substitutes.”20 The court of appeals ruled that the government had failed to establish “a precise definition of browsers” and
“a careful definition of the tied good market” at trial, and would be
precluded from doing so on remand.21 In the face of these impediments, the government decided to drop the tying claim.22
The government’s definitions may have been insufficiently explicit and precise, but Microsoft’s definition of a software product was
downright false and misleading. Throughout the litigation, Microsoft
maintained the position that “software products consist of code and
nothing else[.]”23 This position is untenable, not least because it
makes a mockery out of copyright. A person who, after legitimately
obtaining the Windows software product, made and sold pirated copies of the software in the belief that he or she had “bought” or
“leased” the code would promptly be disabused of that notion by Microsoft’s own legal department.24
arguments of innovation and efficiency offered by all the market participants, and little guidance from established case law.
Luanne Sacks & Garrett Dillon, The Microsoft Decision: A Vivid Reminder That Market
Definition Can Make or Break Your Case, in 22ND ANN. INST. ON COMPUTER L. 429, 474
(PLI Intellectual Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G-691, 2002).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537, 545 (D.D.C. 1997) (appointing then-Harvard law professor Lawrence Lessig as special master to resolve, inter
alia, “the complex issues of cybertechnology” in connection with the predecessor contempt
case); cf. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (declining to
“put[ ] judges and juries in the unwelcome position of designing computers” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J.
925, 937 (2001) (“Computer science and communications technology are much more difficult areas than the average body of scientific or engineering knowledge that lay judges and
jurors are asked to absorb en route to rendering a decision.”).
16. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999).
17. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000).
18. See id. at 56.
19. See New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 98 (D.D.C. 2002) (“Because
all of the district court's factual findings survived challenge on appeal, they comprise the
law of this case and may be relied upon during the remedy phase of this proceeding.”).
20. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 81–82 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
21. See id.
22. See New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d at 95 (citing Joint Status Report
(Sept. 20, 2001) at 2).
23. Defendant’s Revised Proposed Findings of Fact at 263, United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 98-1232) (on file with author).
24. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. CMOS Techs., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 1329 (D.N.J. 1994)
(granting summary judgment of copyright infringement to Microsoft).
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The purchaser of a software product does not acquire plenary
property rights in the accompanying software; rather, he or she purchases legal rights and technological capabilities to use certain services that may be performed by his or her computer system when the
accompanying software is installed and executed on the system under
certain specified conditions. The purchase of a software product is not
the purchase of software code, but the purchase of these rights and
capabilities. A software product market is not a market for software
code, but a market for these rights and capabilities.
Despite these seemingly basic points, the entire record of the Microsoft case is virtually devoid of a reasonably accurate working definition of a software product for purposes of antitrust analysis. There
have been two qualified exceptions. During the trial before Judge
Jackson, one of the government’s computer science expert witnesses,
Princeton University Professor Edward Felten, sought to draw a distinction between software products and software code.25 His efforts
were met with puzzlement, however, because he was unable to articulate this distinction in legal terms.26 Later, in an amicus brief filed at
Judge Jackson’s request,27 Stanford Law School Professor Lawrence
Lessig observed that viewing software products as code “would create
many potential paradoxes of identity,”28 and concluded that a software
product should instead be defined as “functionality separately valued
by consumers.”29 Judge Jackson, however, did not find this definition
explicit or precise enough to dissuade him from relying on the more
intuitive notion that software products consist of code.30
The fallacious premise that software products consist of code has
also been pervasive in the previous legal literature on Microsoft. Vari25. See June 10, 1999 P.M. Session Trial Transcript at 17, United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232) (testimony of Edward Felten) (“I’m
talking about Microsoft’s browser product, which is, as I’ve said, I do not identify with any
particular lines of code.”), available at 1999 WL 380891.
26. On cross-examination during his rebuttal testimony, Felten engaged in the following
colloquy with Microsoft attorney Steven Holley:
Q. [Holley] Let me see if I can understand that one. You say that you
can claim a copyright on software code which is somehow different
than the product? . . .
The Witness [Felten]: I admit I'm not an expert on copyright law, but
whether you can — but code and products are different things, as I
said many times. So, whether you can copyright code or copyright
products, I don't know. I don't see the connection.
Id. at 34.
27. Brief of Professor Lawrence Lessig as Amicus Curiae at v, United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232) (Feb. 1, 2000), available at
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/lessig/content/testimony/ab/ab.pdf.
28. Id. at 20.
29. Id.
30. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 50 (D.D.C. 2000) (characterizing the challenged tying arrangement as requiring consumers “to take, and pay for, the
entire package of software”).
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ous commentators have discussed the sale of code,31 used the terms
“software” and “software product” interchangeably,32 and referred to
the code that comprises Microsoft’s Windows and Internet Explorer
software products.33
As one of the most important and most studied cases in the history of antitrust, Microsoft has rightly been added to the elite canon of
principal cases that comprise the basic antitrust curriculum.34 Even so,
the Microsoft decisions, and their accompanying secondary literature,
fail to teach any generally applicable procedures for defining a software product and a relevant software product market.35 Without these
31. See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in Software Markets, in
COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL
MARKETPLACE 29, 66 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1999) (defining the
tying of software products “carefully” as the refusal “to sell program A (the ‘tying’ good)
unless the customer also purchases program B (the ‘tied’ good)”); id. at 76 (noting that a
possible antitrust response to Microsoft would be “a policy of requiring a modular approach
to the production and sale of code, with well-defined, open interfaces between the modules”); George L. Priest, Letter to Larry, INDUS. STANDARD, June 26, 2000 (“Judge Jackson
concluded that it is predatory for Microsoft to include Internet Explorer in Windows and to
not charge extra for the added browser code.”) available at 2000 WL 31584005.
32. See, e.g., David K. Lam, Revisiting the Separate Products Issue, 108 YALE L.J. 1441,
1446–47 (1999) (“Microsoft can easily offer the two products separately because ‘software
code by its nature is susceptible to division and combination.’” (quoting United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1998))); Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D.
Willig, Access and Bundling in High-Technology Markets, in COMPETITION, INNOVATION
AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 103, 121
(Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1999) (describing Windows 98 as “a new
product that, in effect, combines both the operating system software and the browser software into one technologically inseparable product.”).
33. See, e.g., David S. Evans, All the Facts that Fit: Square Pegs and Round Holes in
U.S. v. Microsoft, 22 REG., Winter 1999, at 61 (“[T]he court does not mention the evidence . . . that the presence of software code that is within the court’s apparent definition of
‘IE’ supports an improved ‘Help’ system for Windows itself and provides other benefits to
Windows users.”). Another analysis of Windows and Internet Explorer argues that:
Like all software, browsers are, at bottom, binary code arranged in
files, as is the operating system. To the extent Internet Explorer is a
different product from Windows 95, it is because the sequences of 0’s
and 1’s that perform ‘browser functions’ differ from the sequences of
0’s and 1’s that perform ‘Windows 95 functions.’
Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Could Java Change Everything? The Competitive
Propriety of a Proprietary Standard, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 715 (1998).
34. For recent casebooks devoting extensive coverage to Microsoft, see, for example,
ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE 827–58, 908–17, 1028–38,
1081–90 (2002); THOMAS D. MORGAN, MODERN ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS ORIGINS 741–
70 (2d ed. 2001); E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW,
POLICY AND PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 569–77, 716–36 (5th ed. 2003).
35. In Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit affirmed Judge Jackson’s delineation of a relevant
worldwide market for Intel-compatible personal computer operating system software products, in which Windows 98 competes. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 54. Judge Jackson’s analysis did not, however, begin with a precise definition of Microsoft’s operating system
software product. See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 12 (defining “operating system” as “a
software program that controls the allocation and use of computer resources . . . [and] supports the functions of software programs, called ‘applications,’ that perform specific useroriented tasks,” but failing to define an operating system software product). His approach
therefore cannot be relied on, as a more general matter, to identify a defendant’s software
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basic staples of antitrust analysis in hand, further study of the Microsoft case can provide only limited guidance to future antitrust practitioners in the software industry.
The purpose of this Article is to develop legally sufficient and
generally applicable procedures for identifying the legal rights and
technological capabilities that constitute a software product and for
delineating the relevant market or markets in which a given software
product competes. Because these techniques will be grounded in basic
software engineering concepts and prevailing copyright and antitrust
doctrines, this Article will refer to them collectively as the “first principles approach” to antitrust analysis.
At the outset, it will be necessary to expunge the false and misleading intuition that software products consist solely of code, and to
supplant it with a legally and technologically accurate definition of a
software product. In general terms, a software product is defined by
reference to accompanying software and documentation, and consists
essentially of the necessary legal rights, and technological capabilities, to install and run the software on a system according to the
documentation; it does not include any of the software or documentation itself.36 More explicit detail will be needed, however, to obviate
the reliance of antitrust analysis on misleading intuitions;37 for this, it
will be necessary to look to copyright law and software engineering.
In addition to a more accurate definition of a software product,
antitrust analysis also requires a rigorous methodology for defining
the relevant markets in which a given software product competes. Accordingly, a series of structured inquiries is needed to identify, inter
alia, products that “have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced”38 or that support particular end
uses for the given product that may be susceptible to price discrimination.39 The role of antitrust may be understood in this context as promoting “well-functioning software product markets” by protecting
price and/or quality competition among the identified products.
In Part II, this Article develops a structured approach to delineating software product markets. This Part begins by describing the role
of product and geographic market definitions in antitrust jurisprudence and reviewing the legal doctrines governing product market
definition. Next, this Article describes the purposes that a software
product serves, and introduces the concept of an “essential use case,”
which describes software functionality at an appropriate level of abproduct and to explain “why certain other products are not reasonable substitutes” for the
defendant’s product. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 81–82.
36. See infra text accompanying note 165.
37. See supra text accompanying note 30.
38. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 399 (1956); see also
infra Part II.A.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 141–144.
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straction for purposes of determining reasonable interchangeability of
use. Several technological impediments that may constitute structural
barriers to entry into a software product market are also identified.
This Section formulates a procedure is then formulated for defining
the relevant product market in which a given software product competes by using concepts relating to demand and supply substitutability. Finally, it explains the practical relevance of protecting
competition in these software product markets by describing the characteristics of a well-functioning market from the perspective of software development and innovation.
Part III explains the provenance of the legal rights that constitute
a software product by examining the Copyright Act’s grant of specific
exclusionary rights to a software developer. First, it reviews legal doctrines governing the scope of copyrightable subject matter in software.
Then, this Section examines the scope of the exclusionary rights that
are implicated by a consumer’s use of a software product. These
rights may be conferred either by the copyright statute’s default allocation of rights or by the terms of an enforceable user license. This
analysis not only yields a more precise description of the legal rights
and technological capabilities that constitute a software product, but
also clarifies the limits of the Copyright Act as a warrant for exclusionary conduct that involves the licensing of copyrighted software.
To conclude, Part IV illustrates the practical applicability of the
first principles approach by considering another case, Syncsort Inc. v.
Sequential Software, Inc., in which the plaintiff failed to take sufficient care in defining the relevant market in which the defendant’s
software product competes.40 This Section shows that the pursuit of
well-functioning software product markets may inform the law’s response to software innovation in addressing the current controversy
over the use of peer-to-peer network (“P2P”) software products to
trade copyrighted files over the Internet. Some final remarks follow
regarding the pursuit of “human-centric” computing.
Obviously, the first principles approach also has potentially profound implications for Microsoft. If the government plaintiffs had
been able to establish “a precise definition of browsers” and “a careful
definition of the tied good market” at trial, they may have been able to
prevail on the tying claim before the D.C. Circuit. To see whether this
would actually have been the case, however, will require a detailed
review of the tying claim’s extraordinarily complex litigation history
and a careful liability analysis under each of the alternative doctrines
for adjudicating that claim in light of the first principles approach pre-

40. 50 F. Supp. 2d 318 (D.N.J. 1999).
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sented here. This analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, but is
fully set forth in a companion piece.41

II. DEFINING SOFTWARE PRODUCT MARKETS
A. Market Definition Generally
In general, two products belong in the same relevant market when
the ability of consumers and producers to substitute between them
imposes an effective competitive constraint against the exercise of
monopoly power.42 The definition of a relevant market serves to describe a boundary between products43 that compete with each other in
this way and those that do not. This boundary has two dimensions
which are determined through separate lines of analysis: a geographic
market and a product market. A geographic market defines the “area
of effective competition . . . in which the seller operates, and to which
the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies.”44 A product market
identifies “producers which, because of the similarity of their products, have the ability — actual or potential — to take significant
amounts of business away from each other.”45
Market definition, like the rest of antitrust jurisprudence, is not an
exact science,46 and the method described herein constitutes only one
of many potentially valid approaches to defining product markets in
the software industry.47 The Supreme Court has characterized the
product market inquiry as identifying those “products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are pro41. Andrew Chin, Decoding Microsoft: A First Principles Approach, 39 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
42. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES §§ 1.11, 1.21 (1992), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,104 [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES] (describing product and geographic markets as
product groupings and regions in which a “hypothetical monopolist” could profitably impose a “small but significant and nontransitory” price increase); George J. Stigler, Introduction to NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 4
(1955) (“An industry should embrace the maximum geographical area and the maximum
variety of productive activities in which there is a strong long-run substitution.”).
43. Throughout this Article, the term “products” refers to both products and services.
44. United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 359 (1963) (quoting Tampa
Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961)) (internal quotations omitted)
(emphasis omitted).
45. SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1063 (3d Cir. 1978).
46. See, e.g., Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 360 n.37 (noting that “fuzziness” is inherent in the determination of a relevant geographic market); Pitofsky, supra note 13, at
1812 (arguing that market definition should be seen “as an array of estimates with no market
description being exactly right”).
47. See, e.g., James A. Keyte, Market Definition and Differentiated Products: The Need
for a Workable Standard, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 697, 699 (1995) (noting “the lack of any clear
standard for defining the relevant product market”); Pitofsky, supra note 13, at 1807 (noting
the “persistent and unreconciled conflicts of approach [to market definition] in important
judicial decisions”).
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duced — price, use, and qualities considered.”48 Phillip Areeda’s treatise describes market definition as contingent on a “critical policy
choice”: namely, the extent and duration of market power that will be
considered legally problematic in the context of any particular antitrust case.49 This Article does not purport to provide a definitive standard for reasonable interchangeability or to resolve this critical policy
choice. Rather, by identifying the attributes of and relationships
among software products that are relevant to the product market inquiry, this Article will provide an analytical framework for determining such standards and choices in the context of any particular case.
This Article will only address the problem of defining product
markets in the software industry and not the issue of defining geographic markets. The definition of software product markets warrants
particular attention as a discipline in antitrust practice because it is the
part of the market definition analysis that requires technology-specific
methods.50 Product market analysis in the software industry needs to
consider the specific legal rights and technological capabilities that
comprise a particular software product, so that similar products capable of “tak[ing] significant amounts of business away”51 from it can
be identified.
B. Product Markets Generally
The determination of a product market begins by identifying the
defendant’s product52 as the initial product in a “provisional market.”53 The relevant product market is then defined as the market in
48. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 399 (1956).
49. AREEDA, supra note 1, ¶¶ 530b–c, at 152–54.
50. In contrast, geographic market analysis in the software industry focuses on the physical locations where producers and consumers can find each other to deal in a software product or its substitutes. In this respect, such geographic markets are identified using the same
methods as in any other industry. Even though software and other information products are
distinctive in that they may be distributed over the Internet, geographic market analysis does
not examine any technological aspect of the software product itself. Mischaracterizations of
software technology and intellectual property concepts are therefore more likely to lead to
errors in product market definition than in geographic market definition. For an earlier appreciation of these difficulties, see Robert H. Lande & Sturgis M. Sobin, Reverse Engineering of Computer Software and U.S. Antitrust Law, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 237, 252–53
(1996) (describing software product market definition as “an extremely complex and intensely fact-dependent area of law”).
51. See SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1063 (3d Cir. 1978).
52. The product market definition analysis thus begins by taking the defendant’s product
as it is actually sold, without regard to the distinct question of whether the defendant’s
product is a “single product” under tying doctrine.
53. See AREEDA, supra note 1, ¶ 560, at 251. Antitrust liability may be based on harms to
competition not only in product markets consisting of the economic substitutes for one
product, but also in “cluster markets” that aggregate markets for numerous products sold by
the defendant even though they may not be economic substitutes for each other. This approach is for administrative convenience and may not be undertaken where separate treatment of the products would result in a different conclusion regarding the existence or cause
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which this initial product competes. The analysis proceeds by iteratively extending the boundaries of the provisional market to include
additional products that may be significant substitutes for the products
already found to be in the provisional market.54 The provisional market is recognized as the relevant product market when no more such
substitutes can be added. Substitution may occur on both the demand
side (when consumers are able to switch from using one product to
using another)55 and the supply side (when producers are able to
switch from making one product to making another).56 If product A is
in the relevant market, and a significant price increase beyond the
competitive level in the price of A would induce customers of A to
buy product B instead, or induce producers of B to make and sell A
instead, then B should also be included in the relevant market.57 In
either case, products A and B “have the ability — actual or potential — to take significant amounts of business away from each
other,”58 and are deemed to be in effective competition with each
other.59
The definition of a product market thus calls for a careful analysis
of demand and supply substitutability. As the Supreme Court explained in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, courts are to perform this
analysis by examining the available evidence relating to (1) “reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it,” and (2) seven
“practical indicia,” namely “industry or public recognition of the
[product market] as a separate economic entity, the product’s peculiar
characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors.”60

of monopoly power. See generally United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1375–77
(D.D.C. 1981) (aggregating markets for 200,000 products sold by defendant into a single
cluster market).
54. See AREEDA, supra note 1, ¶ 560, at 251.
55. See id. ¶ 562, at 258–66.
56. See id. ¶ 561, at 252–58.
57. See id. ¶ 561, at 252.
58. SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1063 (3d Cir. 1978).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 42–45.
60. 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). While Brown Shoe identifies these indicia as relevant specifically in connection with the determination of “submarkets,” courts and commentators
have widely recognized their applicability to the delineation of product markets in general,
and it is doubtful whether there remains any meaningful distinction between the identification of submarkets and product markets. See generally Rothery Storage & Van Co., v. Atlas
Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (concluding that “submarket indicia” are
best viewed as “proxies for cross-elasticities” of supply and demand); AREEDA, supra note
1, ¶ 533c, at 170–73 (“Only ‘markets’ are relevant.”).
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1. Demand Substitutability
The analysis of demand substitutability looks to “the reasonable
interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the
[initial] product itself and substitutes for it.”61 Although the crosselasticity of demand between two products is a precise quantity,62 in
practice courts rarely consider precise cross-elasticity data.63 Instead,
most courts use the term more generally as a synonym for “reasonable
interchangeability of use,” as discerned from the qualitative tendency
of an increase in the price of one product to result in an increase in the
demand for a second product within a reasonably short time.64
Two products are said to exhibit reasonable interchangeability of
use if (1) they are functionally interchangeable and (2) purchasers
have a significant propensity to switch from one to the other in response to a change in price.65 Strictly speaking, however, only the
second of these criteria must be met: “The ultimate determinant of
whether products belong in the same market is whether customers are
willing to substitute one product for the other.”66 Functional interchangeability is, however, a necessary (but not sufficient)67 condition
61. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325.
62. The cross-elasticity of demand is the percentage change in demand for one good attributable to a percentage change in the price of another good. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN &
JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 31
(3d ed. 1998).
63. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, at 503–05; see also AREEDA,
supra note 1, ¶ 531, at 187 (noting that if the defendant’s own elasticities of supply and
demand were known, it would be possible to infer market power directly, and therefore
unnecessary to infer it from market share and market definition).
64. See AREEDA, supra note 1, ¶ 531, at 187.
65. See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1074 (D.D.C. 1997) (“[T]he general
question is ‘whether two products can be used for the same purpose, and if so, whether and
to what extent purchasers are willing to substitute one for the other.’” (citing Hayden Pub.
Co. v. Cox Broad. Corp., 730 F.2d 64, 70 n.8 (2d Cir. 1984))).
66. ABA SECTION ON ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, at 505. Similar reasoning appears
in other sources:
The [du Pont] Court's product market inquiry into reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the
product itself and substitutes for it subsumes both the functional interchangeability of products and the actual propensity of buyers to
switch from product A to product B in response to changes in price.
Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust for the Economy of Ideas: The Logic of Technology Markets,
14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 83, 89 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. See, e.g., U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 995–99 (11th Cir.
1993) (finding brand-name anchors functionally interchangeable with generic anchors, but
finding that there was insufficient evidence of demand substitutability between them);
United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 866 F.2d 242, 246 (8th Cir. 1988) (accepting
finding that sugar and high fructose corn syrup are functionally interchangeable, but concluding that “they are not reasonably interchangeable because of the price differential between the two products”); United States v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 246 F. Supp. 464, 468 n.3
(E.D.N.Y. 1965) (“While a finding of functional interchangeability must precede that of
reasonable (reactive) interchangeability, it is not determinative. For products to be classified
in the same market they must be both functionally and reasonably interchangeable.”).
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for consumers to be able to switch between two products, and serves
as a useful heuristic filter to identify possibly competing products.
Thus, in the standard formulation of the reasonable interchangeability
inquiry, functional interchangeability is considered first.68
a. Functional Interchangeability
When a product can be used for only one purpose, the functional
interchangeability inquiry is relatively straightforward: another product either serves the same purpose or it does not. For products that can
be used for multiple purposes, however, there does not appear to be a
bright-line test for functional interchangeability. On the one hand,
“functional interchangeability does not require complete identity of
use.”69 For example, in United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., a finding that cellophane “has to meet competition from other
materials in every one of its uses” was sufficient for the Supreme
Court to conclude that “a very considerable degree of functional interchangeability exists between these products,”70 even though no single
material was a significant competitor to cellophane in all of cellophane’s uses.71 On the other hand, it may sometimes be proper to
draw a product market boundary that distinguishes a group of buyers
who are interested in a product only for certain purposes.72 For example, the Seventh Circuit upheld a product market definition that included sales of new components for automotive electrical units to
rebuilders who used them in production-line work, but excluded such
sales to rebuilders who used them in custom or retail work.73
Given the indeterminacy that arises when there is competition
with respect to some but not all of the purposes served by the defendant’s product, it should be noted that the functional interchangeability inquiry is neither intended nor suited to resolve these complexities.
It seems prudent in such cases to stop at identifying the group of
products that are separately functionally interchangeable with the de68. See Pfizer, 246 F. Supp. at 468. The court stated:
To determine whether [products] are in competition in a particular industry it is first necessary to decide whether they can be used for the
same purpose — whether they are functionally interchangeable; and
functional interchangeability does not require complete identity of
use. Having found one or more products functionally interchangeable
with [the product] in a particular use, the next question to be resolved
is one of purchaser reaction — the willingness or readiness to substitute one for the other.
Id. (citation omitted).
69. Id.
70. 351 U.S. 377, 399 (1956).
71. See id. at 407 (showing market shares of different wrapping materials for various end
uses of cellophane).
72. See infra text accompanying notes 86–120 (describing price discrimination markets).
73. See Avnet, Inc. v. FTC, 511 F.2d 70, 77–79 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J.).
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fendant’s product in each of its relevant uses,74 and to defer the ultimate question of which products are functionally interchangeable for
purposes of defining the relevant product market until the propensity
of purchasers to switch can be examined.75
b. Propensity to Switch
The inquiry into the propensity of purchasers to switch between
products is directed to “whether buyers would respond to a significant
increase in the price of A [from the competitive level to a supracompetitive level] by so shifting to product B as to make that price increase unprofitable to the A producers.”76 Observed shifts between
products,77 correlation in the prices or price movements of products,78
or “the factors that normally determine the choice or preference of the
user”79 demonstrate a willingness to make such a shift between products.
c. Product and Price Differentiation
Courts often define product markets broadly enough to encompass differences that are material in the minds of buyers.80 Even substantial differences in product features may “wash out,” either when a
particular product has both wanted and unwanted features or when
different buyers have opposite preferences for a particular feature.81
Notwithstanding any differences in price and features between
two products, if preferences with respect to such factors show that
consumers are willing to switch between them, then a court will find
that the products are reasonably interchangeable.82 Generally, “a price
differential, even a substantial one, is irrelevant for purposes of determining reasonable interchangeability.”83 This is because price dif74. See supra note 68 (describing functional interchangeability inquiry as directed to
finding “one or more products functionally interchangeable with [the product] in a particular
use”).
75. See infra text accompanying notes 104–108.
76. AREEDA, supra note 1, ¶ 562, at 258.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. Pfizer, 246 F. Supp. at 468.
80. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (various flexible packaging materials); United States v. Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 456–57
(1964) (glass jars and metal cans); Cable Holdings v. Home Video, Inc., 825 F.2d 1559,
1563 (11th Cir. 1987) (cable television, satellite television, videocassettes, and free broadcast television); FTC v. PPG Indus., 798 F.2d 1500, 1504–06 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (glass and
plastic aircraft transparencies).
81. See supra note 80.
82. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, at 508–16 (reviewing cases involving differences in product type, differences in grade or quality, price differences and
trends, and differences in product condition or availability).
83. United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 866 F.2d 242, 246 (8th Cir. 1988).
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ferentials between functionally interchangeable products, absent a
structural barrier to entry into the product market, are usually offset
by differences in quality or other preferred attributes, thereby allowing the prices of more and less expensive products to constrain one
another.84 Courts have been particularly reluctant to define product
markets based on differences in price or quality where a group of
functionally interchangeable products forms a continuous spectrum of
choices for consumers.85
d. Price Discrimination Markets
When user preferences regarding product characteristics vary
enough to raise the possibility of price discrimination, this may justify
the delineation of additional, narrower markets around groups of
“captive” or “inframarginal” buyers to whom a significant price increase could be profitably targeted.86 While such a “price discrimination market” is predicated on the theory that price discrimination
against the captive buyers is possible, its valid use is not limited to
cases involving an actual or alleged practice of price discrimination.87
For purposes of market share/market power analysis, a price discrimination market stands on equal footing with any other relevant product
market.88
To succeed with a price discrimination strategy, a seller must be
able to identify and discriminate in price against a group of buyers
who would not switch to other products, or find other sources, in sufficient numbers to make a “small but significant and nontransitory”
price increase unprofitable.89 In particular, other customers who can
84. See AREEDA, supra note 1, ¶ 563, at 267–68.
85. See, e.g., In re Super Premium Ice Cream Distrib. Antitrust Litig., 691 F. Supp. 1262,
1268 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (“Courts have repeatedly rejected efforts to define markets by price
variances or product quality variances. Such distinctions are economically meaningless
where the differences are actually a spectrum of price and quality differences.” (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted)); but see United States v. Gillette Co., 828 F. Supp. 78, 83
(D.D.C. 1993) (defining a market for premium writing instruments in a retail price range
between $50 and $400); Keyte, supra note 47, at 722 (describing Gillette as “arguably
breath[ing] some life back into carving out submarkets along a continuous price continuum”).
86. Commentators have likened groups of captive buyers to the “distinct customers” referred to as one of the Brown Shoe indicia. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Stepping Out in an
Old Brown Shoe: In Qualified Praise of Submarkets, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 203, 207–08 & 208
n.20 (2000).
87. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1985) (prohibiting seller from “discriminat[ing] in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality” when such discrimination adversely affects competition).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d 95, 106–07 (2d Cir. 1995)
(considering a price discrimination market proposed to resolve a monopolization claim with
a consent decree); HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 42, § 1.12 (defining price
discrimination markets for use in merger review).
89. See id.
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buy at a lower price must not be able to engage widely in arbitrage;
i.e., purchasing the product for resale to disfavored buyers.90
The courts have recognized the ability to price-discriminate as
relevant evidence of market power,91 and have acknowledged support
for price discrimination markets in the agency guidelines and in academic commentary.92 Thus far, however, they have provided only
scattered precedent for a price discrimination approach to market
definition.93
For example, in U.S. Anchor Manufacturing., Inc. v. Rule Industries, Inc.,94 an Eleventh Circuit case, U.S. Anchor alleged that Rule
had attempted to monopolize a market for fluke anchors that encompassed generic and economy anchors as well as Rule’s exclusive
“Danforth” brand anchors.95 Rule argued that the relevant product
market consisted of generic and economy anchors only.96 At trial, the
district court denied Rule’s motion for a directed verdict, and the jury
found Rule liable on the attempted monopolization claim.97 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether U.S. Anchor had intro90. See id.; Pitofsky, supra note 13, at 1814.
91. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 617 (1977) (“[I]f, as
some economists have suggested, the purpose of a tie-in is often to facilitate price discrimination, such evidence would imply the existence of power that a free market would not
tolerate.”); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 475–78
(1992) (citing Kodak’s ability to price-discriminate against unsophisticated, small-volume,
and locked-in customers as supporting Image’s allegations of market power); Coal Exps.
Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. United States, 745 F.2d 76, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[I]t is well established that the ability of a firm to price discriminate is an indicator of significant monopoly
power.”).
This principle is not uncontroversial. Some commentators have recently argued that
the practice of “economic price discrimination,” in which the packaging of items is used to
“meter” differing consumer valuations of different products, is consistent with vigorous
competition and therefore does not imply market power. See Benjamin Klein & John
Shepard Wiley Jr., Competitive Price Discrimination As An Antitrust Justification for Intellectual Property Refusals to Deal, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 599, 624–29 (2003); Michael E. Levine, Price Discrimination Without Market Power, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 8–21 (2002). But
see Jonathan Baker, Competitive Price Discrimination: The Exercise of Market Power Without Anticompetitive Effects, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 643, 649–54 (2003) (replying to Klein and
Wiley). These commentators, however, have neither questioned the practice of defining
price discrimination markets, nor suggested that it is unnecessary to direct antitrust scrutiny
to the possible anticompetitive exercise of market power against identifiable groups of inframarginal consumers to whom a price increase could be profitably directed.
92. See United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d 95, 106–07 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing
AREEDA, supra note 1, ¶ 534d, at 183–85; Pitofsky, supra note 13).
93. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 17, at 62
(1977) (noting that the Supreme Court has never explicitly articulated a price discrimination
approach to market definition).
94. See U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 998 (11th Cir. 1993)
(noting that the ability to price-discriminate against a distinct group of customers “demonstrates the existence of market power with respect to that group” and “may, as a practical
matter, remove the higher priced product from the broader market composed of its functional substitutes” (citations omitted)).
95. See id. at 989–91.
96. See id. at 991.
97. See id. at 992.
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duced sufficient evidence to raise a jury question on the inclusion of
Danforth anchors in the relevant product market.98 After examining
the Brown Shoe indicia,99 the court concluded that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find significant crosselasticities of demand and supply between Danforth and the less expensive anchors.100 The court then observed that “[t]he fluke anchor
industry presented the unusual circumstance of severe price discrimination” against consumers loyal to Danforth, and that this brand loyalty may have been sufficient to justify finding a separate market for
the Danforth anchors.101 The court noted that such a finding, without
more, would not necessarily imply that Danforth anchors were to be
excluded from the relevant product market.102 In the absence of “demonstrable empirical evidence” of supply and demand substitution
between Danforth and the other anchors, however, the court concluded as a matter of law that the Danforth anchors should have been
excluded from the relevant product market.103
A clearer case for price discrimination markets is presented when
consumer groupings are based not on brand loyalty or personal tastes,
but on the buyers’ utilities for the various purposes that a product may
serve.104 Accordingly, the agencies define a product market as “consisting of a particular use or uses by groups of buyers of the product”
that could be profitably discriminated against by a hypothetical mo98. See id. at 994.
99. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
100. See U.S. Anchor Mfg., 7 F.3d at 996–97.
101. Id. at 997.
102. See id. at 998.
103. Id. at 998–99.
104. See Keyte, supra note 47, at 741. Keyte observes that:
Identifying inframarginal consumers becomes much more complex
when . . . a consumer’s reluctance to switch products reflects brand
preferences or purely personal tastes rather than the utility of the
product itself. In these circumstances some courts have found that it
is unrealistic to attempt to define an inframarginal group of consumers around any particular product characteristic . . . .
Id. Such groupings are characteristic of markets for software products and other information
goods in particular. As at least one court and numerous commentators have observed, intellectual property rights serve in part as legal guarantees of an owner’s ability to pricediscriminate based on end-use segments. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447,
1449–50 (7th Cir. 1996); Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2067–72 (2000); James Boyle, Cruel, Mean,
or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53
VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2027–35 (2000); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1801–08 (2000); William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the
Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1234–40 (1998); Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual
Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367,
1369 (1998); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1813, 1878–81 (1984); Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and
Piracy: Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845, 877–80 (1997); Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 80–90
(2001).
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nopolist.105 Courts have most commonly defined price discrimination
markets by identifying one or more segments of consumers, each associated with one or more of the product’s distinct “end uses.”106 For
example, in Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line
Co., a district court analyzing a monopolization claim against Panhandle reasoned that the natural gas market needed to be “narrowed
by reference to the capabilities of different types of end-users to take
advantage of either alternative fuel or energy conservation methods or
both.”107 After a bench trial, the court found that residential and commercial end-users had “much more restricted” abilities to conserve
their consumption of natural gas or switch to other fuels than industrial end-users, and concluded that sales of natural gas to residential
and commercial end-users constituted the relevant product market.108
Although Panhandle was shown to have market power in this market,109 the court ultimately concluded that Panhandle’s conduct in
most instances did not constitute willful acquisition or maintenance of
monopoly power.110
For an end use to serve as the basis for a price discrimination
market, it must specifically account for some significant part of the
consumer demand for the product. Such an end use therefore must be
complete, meaningful, and well-defined in the eyes of consumers, and
must not be functionally interchangeable with any other end use or
combination of end uses. For example, in Nobel Scientific Industries
v. Beckman Instruments, Inc.,111 the defendant Beckman was one of
several companies that made blood analyzing machines and reagents.112 Nobel alleged that Beckman had monopolized or attempted
to monopolize the market for machines capable of performing seven
particular tests simultaneously on a “stat” (high priority) basis, as well
as the market for reagents to be used in such machines.113 On Beckman’s motion for summary judgment, the court rejected Nobel’s market definition, citing uncontradicted evidence that the need to perform
the seven specified stat tests simultaneously on one machine was not a
complete, meaningful, and well-defined end use in the eyes of hospitals and laboratories.114 Expert witnesses testified that hospitals base
decisions to purchase analyzing machines on the cost and availability

105. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 42, § 1.12.
106. See Keyte, supra note 47, at 740–41.
107. Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 730 F. Supp. 826, 900 (C.D.
Ill. 1990).
108. Id.
109. See id. at 902–06.
110. See id. at 910.
111. 670 F. Supp. 1313 (D. Md. 1986).
112. See id. at 1315–16.
113. See id. at 1317–19.
114. See id. at 1319.
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of the reagents and of other services needed to run an analyzer115 and
the need to perform “routine” (normal priority) tests and tests for
other chemicals.116 The evidence also showed that Beckman’s machine was functionally interchangeable with other individual analyzers and combinations of analyzers for the purpose of performing the
seven specified tests,117 and that Beckman’s reagents were functionally interchangeable with reagents sold by others for conducting the
tests on Beckman’s and other companies’ machines.118 The court concluded that it would be “overly restrictive” to define the product market by attributing consumer demand specifically to the seven specified
tests where “few, if any, of the analyzers available [were] specifically
limited to doing the seven named tests”119 and where consumers valued the analyzers and reagents for many other features and purposes.120
To summarize, a product that has multiple uses may be found to
face competition in two or more relevant product markets, each involving a significant group of consumers who are specifically interested in some subset of uses. A precise definition of these markets,
however, requires an equally precise characterization of a “use”; one
will be supplied for software products in Part II.C.
e. Illustration: Product Differentiation and Price Discrimination in
the Cellophane Case
In United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., the government charged du Pont with monopolizing the manufacture and sale of
cellophane in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Supreme
Court, on direct appeal, reviewed the district court’s determination
that the “relevant market for determining the extent of du Pont’s market control” was not cellophane, but all flexible packaging materials.121 Noting that physical characteristics do not necessarily serve to
115. See id.
116. See id. at 1321.
117. See id. at 1320.
118. See id. at 1320–22.
119. Id. at 1320.
120. See id. The court noted:
Some analyzers are valued for the number of tests they can do, some
for their speed, some for their cost, and some for other features. All of
the machines, however, compete for the same contracts and business.
Therefore, one cannot separate out the competition to sell reagents for
only these seven tests. Reagent competition is for selling reagents for
any of the tests that the machines can run.
Id.
121. 351 U.S. 377, 380 (1956). A different aspect of the Supreme Court’s market definition analysis in the Supreme Court’s market definition analysis in the “Cellophane case,”
namely the Court’s approach to the calculation of demand cross-elasticity, has long been
criticized, but is not materially relevant to the present discussion. For criticism of the “Cel-

20

Harvard Journal of Law & Technology

[Vol. 18

distinguish one material from another for purposes of the market definition inquiry,122 a 4–3 majority of the Court held that “[i]n determining the market under the Sherman Act, it is the use or uses to which
the commodity is put that control.”123 Turning to the trial record, the
Court noted differences among the physical characteristics and prices
of cellophane and other flexible packaging materials, but found that
cellophane “has to meet competition from other materials in every one
of its uses” and that “a very considerable degree of functional interchangeability exists between these products.”124 In the case of
Pliofilm, a more expensive alternative to cellophane, the Court found
that its superior physical characteristics, which made it preferable for
use in wrapping meat, “apparently offset cellophane’s price advantage,” thereby making the price of Pliofilm a constraint on the price of
cellophane in the eyes of consumers.125 The Court concluded that the
relevant market “is composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced — price,
use and qualities considered.”126 Therefore, the relevant market included at least the packaging materials that were shown at trial to be
functionally interchangeable with cellophane.127 Given cellophane’s
“competition and interchangeability with other wrappings,” du Pont
was not liable for monopolization.128
The dissenters objected that du Pont, by monopolizing cellophane, could price-discriminate against certain end-use segments,
such as buyers engaged in wrapping cigarettes, who required cellophane in part for properties that other flexible packaging materials did
not have.129 Commenting on the case, Robert Pitofsky answers that
any such discrimination would have been defeated by arbitrage,130 but
observes that arbitrage opportunities in general do not follow immediately from a price differential:
To be effective in the arbitrage business, the customers must know the identity of the other customers
lophane fallacy,” see, for example, RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 128 (1976); Donald
F. Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARV. L. REV. 281, 309 (1956).
122. 351 U.S. at 394.
123. Id. at 395–96.
124. Id. at 399.
125. Id. at 399–400.
126. Id. at 404.
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 424–25 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
130. See Pitofsky, supra note 13, at 1814; accord SBC Comm’ns Inc. v. FCC, 56 F.3d
1484, 1493–94 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (affirming the FCC’s determination that relevant market
was for all interexchange service rather than interexchange service to cellular customers,
inter alia, because of the California attorney general’s finding that “arbitrage activities
would defeat any attempt by AT&T/McCaw to raise cellular interexchange rates above
existing levels”).
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who are being discriminated against, undertake the
expenses of buying, storing, reselling, and reshipping
the product, and do so at a scale that would make an
impact on the discriminating sellers. Finally, the arbitrageurs must be willing to go into this new business at whatever investment level is required,
knowing that they could be frustrated completely in
their initiative if the seller abandons its discriminatory scheme.131
f. Quality Restraints
Non-price competition among functionally interchangeable products, particularly those “in which differences in features are important
(and in which improvement is possible),” is especially vital to consumers in the software industry.132 To the extent that such non-price
competition is recognized as a concern of antitrust law,133 the practice
of defining markets based on price discrimination should account for
the ability of a seller with market power to discriminate against a particular end-use segment by reducing the quality of the product signifi-

131. Pitofsky, supra note 13, at 1848–49.
132. Glen Holly Entm’t, Inc. v. Tektronix, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1081 (C.D. Cal.
1999); see also Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U.
PITT. L. REV. 503, 517 (2001) (noting that nonprice competition is most likely to be necessary to protect consumer choice “with respect to certain kinds of intellectual property, some
of which can play a competitive role only in an environment of organizational independence”).
Microsoft chairman Bill Gates has acknowledged that non-price competition can predominate over price competition in a software market:
With intellectual property, the upfront costs are what it's all
about . . . . Say a piece of software costs $10 million to create and the
marginal costs, because it's going to be distributed electronically, are
basically zero. Once the costs of development have been recouped,
every single additional unit is pure profit. But if someone comes
along with a significantly superior product, your demand can literally
almost drop to zero.
Alan Murray, Intellectual Property: Old Rules Don't Apply, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2001, at
A1 (quoting Gates).
133. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 52 (1911) (identifying “[t]he
danger of deterioration in quality of the monopolized article” as one of the three “evils” of
monopoly); Weit v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457, 477 (7th Cir. 1981)
(citing C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir. 1952)) (“[I]n
an oligopoly . . . non-price competition is valuable, and anything tending to standardize nonprice terms harms competition.”); In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d
702, 711 (D. Md. 2001) (“Since businesses compete through both lower prices and superior
performance, a firm's stifling of innovative products would cause antitrust injury.”); Douglas H. Ginsburg, Nonprice Competition, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 83, 83 n.1 (1993) (citing
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 463 (1980)) (noting Court’s “appreciat[ion]
that an agreement to fix a nonprice term of trade is analytically indistinguishable from an
agreement to fix price”).
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cantly below a competitive level with respect to that end use only.134
Since a reduction in the quality of a product constitutes an increase in
the product’s quality-adjusted price,135 such a practice is equivalent to
quality-adjusted price discrimination against the end-use segment in
question. A price discrimination market should be defined accordingly. Even though this form of discrimination against a group of
buyers may not be cognizable as price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act,136 it provides an appropriate criterion for identifying a market in which non-price competition may be harmed by the
exercise of market power.137
Quality-adjusted price discrimination markets of this kind are
more likely to involve information goods than the physical goods that
typically have been the subjects of price discrimination theories of
market definition. The basic fact that physical goods are fully characterized by their physical properties is likely to constrain a seller’s ability to reduce quality with respect to only one end use. For example,
Robert Pitofsky’s observation that arbitrage would defeat price discrimination in du Pont138 implicitly relies on the reasonable assumption that any attempt to modify the physical properties of cellophane
(e.g., heat-sealability, printability, clarity, tear and burst strength, and
resistance to oils)139 to make it less useful for wrapping cigarettes
134. A seller with market power may find it profitable to reduce product quality in the
eyes of a captive group of consumers if the seller can thereby reduce production costs or,
more generally, if the seller’s interests are adverse in some way to the consumers’ preferences.
135. See Timpinaro v. SEC, 2 F.3d 453, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Ginsburg, J.) (citing Ginsburg, supra note 133) (noting that non-price discounts “have the same pro-competitive
effect as a price discount”).
Quality and price may not be fully commensurable in quantitative terms. See Lande, supra note 132, at 516 (noting that “[s]ome elements of non-price competition might be captured through use of the concept of ‘quality-adjusted price,’” but that “‘quality-adjusted
price’ may be a difficult concept to apply in concrete situations where the non-price components of competition are particularly important, or where they take subtle or complex
forms”). The point here is a qualitative one; i.e., that a reduction in the quality of a product
raises the same antitrust concerns as a corresponding increase in the product’s price. See id.;
Peter J. Hammer, Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions: Price and Non-Price
Competition in Hospital Markets, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 727, 759 n.85 (1999) (“It is
simply wrong, however, to conclude that there are no antitrust issues when one observes
constant prices in the face of falling quality.”).
136. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1997) (prohibiting price discrimination between purchasers
of commodities of “like grade [and] quality”).
137. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text; cf. United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
253 F.3d 34, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (noting that plaintiffs needed to establish that
“Microsoft would have the power to raise the price of its browser above, or reduce the quality of its browser below, the competitive level” to show the existence of entry barriers into
the “browser market”); Miller v. Ind. Hosp., 814 F. Supp. 1254 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (“A defendant possesses monopoly power if it has the ability to change the competitive variables of a
product to the disadvantage of consumers without causing effective competitors to enter the
relevant market.” (citation omitted)).
138. See supra text accompanying note 130.
139. See du Pont, 351 U.S. at 411.
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would also reduce its quality with respect to wrapping various
foods.140
In contrast, digital information goods are highly susceptible to a
vendor’s legal and technological controls over individual end uses, as
demonstrated by the burgeoning field of digital rights management.141
An arbitrageur might be able to defeat these controls technologically
by altering the product so that it supports new uses or better supports
existing uses,142 but license terms usually prohibit such activities.143
More generally, intellectual property rights powerfully reinforce a
vendor’s ability to price-discriminate against particular end uses.144
An emerging body of literature has recognized the ability of intellectual property licensors to restrict the market output of quality
through a related but different practice known as “quality discrimination.”145 Quality discrimination occurs whenever a seller “discriminate[s] among consumers with different tastes for quality . . . by
offering an array of qualities.”146 Except in situations involving a reduction in quality targeted at a specific end-use segment, quality discrimination appears to be similar to product differentiation in its
implications for product market definition.147 Quality-adjusted price
discrimination and quality discrimination are distinct factual predicates, and only the former is proposed here as a possible basis for

140. To the extent that du Pont’s cellophane monopoly was derived in part from patent
exclusivity, see id. at 382–84, du Pont was also constrained from modifying the physical
properties of cellophane by the scope of the relevant patent claims.
141. See, e.g., Meurer, supra note 104, at 878 & n.160 (1997) (“Digital technology will
directly facilitate price discrimination by allowing low cost metering of the usage of digital
works.”). For a survey of digital rights management technologies, see, for example, BILL
ROSENBLATT ET AL., DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY (2001);
Stephen M. Kramarsky, Copyright Enforcement in the Internet Age: The Law and Technology of Digital Rights Management, 11 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 1 (2001).
142. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 308
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d
Cir. 2001) (describing the DVD-descrambling software utility known as “DeCSS”); cf.
Meurer, supra note 104, at 86 (2001) (describing arbitrage against software quality discrimination by modifying software to supply missing functionalities). See infra text accompanying notes 145–148 for an explanation of quality discrimination.
143. See Meurer, supra note 104, at 86 (noting that software modifications for the purpose of arbitrage “violate the derivative rights of the copyright owner”); Darren C. Baker,
Note, ProCD v. Zeidenberg: Commercial Reality, Flexibility in Contract Formation, and
Notions of Manifested Assent in the Arena of Shrinkwrap Licenses, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 379,
391 (1997) (describing prohibitions on reverse engineering and modification as “standard or
typical terms” in shrinkwrap licenses).
144. See supra note 104.
145. See, e.g., Meurer, supra note 104, at 73–74; Hal R. Varian, Versioning Information
Goods, in, INTERNET PUBLISHING AND BEYOND: ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL INFORMATION
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Brian Kahin & Hal R. Varian eds, 1997).
146. JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 149–50 (1988).
147. See generally Shubha Ghosh, Gray Markets in Cyberspace, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1
(1999) (characterizing practices of quality discrimination in cyberspace as forms of product
differentiation).
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product market definition.148 The literature on quality discrimination
in intellectual property licensing is worth noting in the present context, however, because it highlights another common situation in the
software industry wherein licensors have wide discretion over product
quality.
2. Supply Substitutability
Although courts have tended to focus more on demand substitutability than on supply substitutability in determining the relevant
product market,149 supply substitutability considerations have been
found to be materially relevant in enough cases that it would be erroneous to define a market on the basis of demand substitutability
alone.150
Recall that the goal in defining a product market is to identify
“producers which, because of the similarity of their products, have the
ability — actual or potential — to take significant amounts of business away from each other.”151 The demand substitutability inquiry,
on the other hand, identifies products that have reasonable interchangeability of use.152 The supply substitutability inquiry serves to
complete the analysis by identifying firms that are actual or potential
producers of these products.
The supply substitutability inquiry focuses on “[c]ross-elasticity
of supply, or production flexibility among sellers”153 or, equivalently,
“the ability of firms in a given line of commerce to turn their productive facilities toward the production of commodities in another line
because of similarities in technology between them.”154 As with crosselasticity of demand, the cross-elasticity of supply between two prod-

148. See supra text accompanying notes 80–85 for a discussion of the analysis of product
differentiation as it relates to product market definition.
149. See ABA SECTION ON ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, at 516.
150. See, e.g., Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1436 (9th Cir. 1995)
(“[D]efining a market on the basis of demand considerations alone is erroneous . . . . A
reasonable market definition must also be based on ‘supply elasticity.’”); Virtual Maint.,
Inc. v. Prime Computer Inc., 11 F.3d 660, 664 (6th Cir. 1993) (“Defining a market, or
‘submarket,’ on the basis of demand considerations alone is erroneous because such an
approach fails to consider the supply side of the market.”); In re Mun. Bond Reporting
Antitrust Litig., 672 F.2d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that plaintiff’s proposed market
definition “fails to give due accord to the significance of elasticity of supply”); United
States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 303 (8th Cir. 1976) (“The cross-elasticity of
supply would seem to be as important as the demand factor in determining relevant product
market.”).
151. SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1063 (3d Cir. 1978) (emphasis
added).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 61–68.
153. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. FTC, 652 F.2d 1324, 1330 (7th Cir. 1981).
154. Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264, 1271 (9th
Cir. 1975).
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ucts is a precise quantity,155 but the issue has usually been formulated
less precisely in antitrust decisions.156 Courts have placed products in
the same product market if they could be produced interchangeably
from the same production facilities,157 but have declined to do so
where there were sufficient barriers, such as large research and development costs,158 to make a shift in production unprofitable.159
The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines provide a theoretically
accurate, if difficult to administer, approach to the analysis of supply
substitution.160 Specifically, the Guidelines include within the relevant
market all firms that currently produce or sell the identified products
and any other firms whose “inclusion would more accurately reflect
probable supply responses.”161 Supply response is deemed probable if
it is “likely to occur within one year and without the expenditure of
significant sunk costs of entry and exit, in response to a ‘small but
significant and nontransitory’ price increase.”162 In determining the
likelihood of supply response, the agencies will consider “technological capability,” as well as any “difficulties in achieving product acceptance, distribution, or production.”163
C. Software Product Markets
1. Consumer Demand for Software Products
Software is code.164 Software is used by installing and running it
on a system, thereby producing system behavior. Consumers desire to
155. The cross-elasticity of supply is the percentage change in supply for one good attributable to a percentage change in the price of another good. See AREEDA, supra note 1,
¶ 507, at 108.
156. See generally ABA SECTION ON ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, at 517–19 & nn.
102–08 (reviewing cases).
157. See, e.g., Yoder Bros. v. Cal.-Fl. Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1367–68 (5th Cir.
1976) (finding that growers could easily switch production from other flowers to chrysanthemums); Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894, 916 (10th Cir. 1975) (finding that manufacturers could switch production from non-IBM-compatible peripherals to IBM-compatible
peripherals).
158. See, e.g., United States v. Ivaco, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1409, 1417 (W.D. Mich. 1989);
In re B.A.T. Indus., 104 F.T.C. 852, 932 (1984).
159. See, e.g., U.S. Anchor Mfg. v. Rule Indus., 7 F.3d 986, 997 (11th Cir. 1993); Ansell,
Inc. v. Schmid Lab., 757 F. Supp. 467, 475–76 (D.N.J. 1991).
160. See Pitofsky, supra note 13, at 1860–61 (opining that the Guidelines “handle these
supply substitution questions well,” but noting that they fail to explain “what sort of evidence properly can be relied upon to establish supply substitution”).
161. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 42, § 1.32.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Software code may be source code or object code. Source code is “[h]umanreadable program statements written by a programmer or developer in a high-level or assembly language that are not directly readable by a computer” and “needs to be compiled
into object code before it can be executed by a computer.” MICROSOFT CORP., MICROSOFT
COMPUTER DICTIONARY 418 (1999). Object code is “[t]he code, generated by a compiler or
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use software for producing system behavior that supports various
tasks (which are sometimes also referred to as functionalities). System
behavior of the kind that supports a task occurs in the form of an interaction between the user and the system.
In response to these consumer desires for user-system interactions, producers market software products. A software product is defined by reference to accompanying software and documentation, and
consists essentially of the legal rights and technological capabilities
necessary to install and run the software on a system according to the
documentation; it does not include any of the software or documentation itself, in which the vendor retains copyright.165 The documentation describes legal and technological preconditions for using the
software product, and tasks that may be supported by using the software product subject to such preconditions.
The use of a software product may require a system to run not
only the software that accompanies the software product, but also
other software that has previously been installed on the system. For
example, the use of application software166 requires the use of preinstalled operating system software.167 It may therefore be a precondition for using one software product that another software product has
previously been acquired and its accompanying software preinstalled
on the system. In such a case, the two products are recognized as
complements, not substitutes.168 Any required preinstalled software is

an assembler, that was translated from the source code of a program,” usually by the software developer or vendor prior to the distribution of the software that accompanies a software product. Id. at 317. Throughout this Article, the term “code” will generally be used to
refer to object code.
165. See infra text accompanying note 445. For example, in a suit by Microsoft for copyright infringement, a defendant who had legitimately obtained a single user license for Microsoft Office could not validly claim to own the accompanying software code itself. See
Microsoft Corp. v. Software Wholesale Club, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1007–08 (S.D. Tex.
2000) (holding defendant liable for copyright infringement because, inter alia, defendant
was unable to show that counterfeit copies had good chain of title).
This distinction between a software product and its accompanying software is a fundamental one. To preserve this distinction, this Article will employ the somewhat unwieldy
terminology “software that accompanies a software product” throughout this Article. As a
side benefit, the distinction also permits the discussion of the “sale” or “purchase” of a
software product without implying that the accompanying software is sold or purchased.
166. An application is a “software program[ ] . . . that perform[s] specific user-oriented
tasks.” United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12 (D.D.C. 1999).
167. An operating system (“OS”) is a “software program that controls the allocation and
use of computer resources (such as processing time, main memory space, disk space, and
input/output channels).” Id.
168. This distinction is especially significant in the context of product market definition.
A properly defined relevant market includes goods that are reasonably close substitutes for
one another, but not complementary goods. See AREEDA, supra note 1, ¶ 565a–b, at 329–
32.
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referred to as platform software. Platform software is often installed
on the system’s hard drive in the form of library files.169
In some systems, platform software may be installed in multiple
layers, where the use of each layer requires the use of the previously
installed layers. The term middleware refers to platform software that
itself requires other platform software in this way.
A software product specifies which software is to run on the system when the software product is used, even though not all such software necessarily accompanies the software product.170 For example, a
program may instruct the system to run specific routines in preinstalled platform software by using the conventions, or calls, defined in
the platform software’s programming interface (which is part of the
documentation accompanying the platform software).171 A software
product is said to support a task if it specifies which software is to run
on the system in order to produce behavior that supports the task, and
(subject to its documented preconditions) confers sufficient legal
rights and technological capabilities to do so.
In summary, a consumer may wish to acquire a software product
because of some of the tasks it supports, or because of its complementarity to some other desired software products that require its acquisition as a precondition. This Article will use the terms consumer
purpose and end use interchangeably and generically to refer to any
such supported task or complementarity relationship.
Some examples of preconditions for the use of and consumer
purposes served by the software products Microsoft Windows, Netscape Navigator for Windows, and Microsoft Word for Windows are:
Microsoft Windows — Precondition: The system is an Intel-based
personal computer (“PC”). Consumer purposes: Platform software for
Netscape Navigator for Windows; platform software for Microsoft
Word for Windows; view the contents of directories on the system’s
hard drive.
Netscape Navigator for Windows — Precondition: Microsoft
Windows software is preinstalled. Consumer purposes: Platform
software for Web-based applications; perform Web transactions.
169. See FREE ON-LINE DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING, at http://foldoc.doc.ic.ac.uk/
foldoc/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2004) (defining “library” as “[a] collection of subroutines and
functions stored in one or more files, usually in compiled form, for linking with other programs”).
170. Specifically, the software that accompanies a software product may make procedure
calls to previously installed software, as when an application makes calls to the application
programming interfaces of an operating system. See id. For a more detailed description of
this process, see infra Part III.B.2; see also JOHN R. LEVINE, LINKERS & LOADERS 187–227
(2000) (describing linking of code using shared libraries, including Windows dynamically
linked libraries). Cf. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 50 (D.D.C. 1999)
(describing “knitting” together of different software layers).
171. See FREE ON-LINE DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING, supra note 169 (defining “application program interface” as “[t]he interface (calling conventions) by which an application
program accesses operating system and other services”).
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Microsoft Word for Windows — Preconditions: Microsoft Windows software is preinstalled; document is a file in Word .DOC format. Consumer purposes: Edit document.
2. Tasks and Essential Use Cases
The procedure for defining product markets described above, particularly price discrimination markets, calls for the consideration of
end uses that may be degraded or withheld at a vendor’s discretion. In
determining a relevant product market in which a particular software
product competes, it is therefore necessary to identify any consumer
purposes that may be cognizable as captive end-use segments under a
price discrimination theory. Any such consumer purpose must be
characterized in terms that are complete, meaningful, and welldefined from the user’s perspective, so that the resulting end-use segment represents a well-defined group of users who are interested in
the software product for that consumer purpose.172 The characterization of a consumer purpose should also be in terms that are simple,
general, abstract, technology-free, and implementation-independent,
so that the corresponding end-use segment avoids drawing false distinctions between different technological approaches to supporting
what is essentially the same task from a user’s perspective.173
Computer scientists and software engineers have considerable experience with the specification of software use, and have developed
many models and methodologies to describe software behavior at
various levels of abstraction.174 Of particular relevance for present
purposes is a highly abstract software modeling construct known as an
essential use case, which was introduced in Larry Constantine and
Lucy Lockwood’s groundbreaking software engineering textbook,
Software for Use:175
An essential use case is a structured narrative, expressed in the language of the application domain
172. See supra text accompanying note 111.
173. Such variations in technological implementation are more appropriately analyzed as
a kind of product differentiation rather than a division of a product market into end-use
segments. See AREEDA, supra note 1, ¶ 563a, at 310 (“Products are differentiated when
many buyers regard them as different even though the products still perform the same essential function.”).
174. For highly formal models of software behavior, see, for example, JOHN COOKE,
CONSTRUCTING CORRECT SOFTWARE (1998); D.C. INCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO DISCRETE
MATHEMATICS, FORMAL SYSTEM SPECIFICATION, AND Z (1993). For highly abstract models, see, for example, STEPHEN M. MCMENAMIN & JOHN F. PALMER, ESSENTIAL SYSTEMS
ANALYSIS (1984). For intermediate approaches, see, for example, ALI BEHFOROOZ &
FREDERICK J. HUDSON, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING FUNDAMENTALS (1996); GRADY BOOCH,
OBJECT-ORIENTED DESIGN WITH APPLICATIONS (1991).
175. LARRY L. CONSTANTINE & LUCY A.D. LOCKWOOD, SOFTWARE FOR USE: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE MODELS AND METHODS OF USAGE-CENTERED DESIGN (1999).
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and of users, comprising a simplified, generalized,
abstract, technology-free and implementationindependent description of one task or interaction
that is complete, meaningful, and well-defined from
the point of view of users in some role or role in relation to a system and that embodies the purpose or intentions underlying the interaction.176
Given this definition and the foregoing discussion, no background in
software engineering is needed to appreciate that the concept of an
essential use case is applicable to product market definition as a way
of characterizing the tasks supported by a software product.
A full overview of the techniques necessary to construct essential
use cases is presented in Chapter 5 of Software for Use and is beyond
the scope of this article.177 A concrete example taken from that chapter, however, will serve to illustrate the suitability of essential use
cases for identifying cognizable end-use segments.
Figure 1: A Use Case for the Task of Getting Cash From an ATM178
gettingCash
User Action
insert card

System Response
read magnetic stripe
request PIN

enter PIN
verify PIN
display transaction option menu
press key
display account menu
press key
prompt for amount
enter amount
display amount
press key
return card
take card
dispense cash
take cash

176. Id. at 103 (emphasis in original).
177. Id. at 97–123.
178. Id. at 102.
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To understand what is meant by an essential use case, it is helpful
to be familiar with the more general concept of a use case. Invented in
the late 1960’s by software engineer Ivar Jacobson,179 use cases are a
methodology for narrating user-system interactions commonly used
by software developers (and increasingly, customers) to describe required system behavior.180 In particular, use cases play a central role
in object-oriented software design techniques using the Unified Modeling Language.181 Figure 1 is a use case depicting the process of getting cash from an automatic teller machine (“ATM”).
Recently, proponents of use case-based design methods have emphasized the importance of describing the user-system interaction at a
high level of abstraction, avoiding any implementation-specific language that assumes particular choices on the part of the designer regarding the system’s behavior and user interface.182 For example, the
use case in Figure 1 presupposes that the user identification mechanism is a card with a magnetic stripe, that the system provides information to the user via a visual display, and that the user provides
information to the system via a keypad.183 The use case limits the
choices available to the designer as to how the system will support the
task of getting cash from an ATM.184 Unless tasks are specified in an
implementation-independent form, software designers may be constrained from choosing the design that best serves the purposes of the
user.185
Figure 2 presents an essential use case for the same task. Note
that all implementation-specific language has been abstracted away,
and the narrative of the user-system interaction is expressed solely
from the perspective of a user who has assumed a particular role in
relation to a system (an account holder) and has a particular purpose
in using the system (getting cash). This essential use case fully captures “the purpose or intentions underlying the interaction”: that is, for
any system to support the task of getting cash from an ATM, it is necessary and sufficient for the system to support each of the interaction
steps shown in Figure 2. Beyond the requirement that the system
serve this specified user purpose, the essential use case does not con179. See ALISTAIR COCKBURN, WRITING EFFECTIVE USE CASES, at xx (2001).
180. See id. at 1–3 (describing a use case as “a contract between the stakeholders of a
system about its behavior”); DARYL KULAK & EAMONN GUINEY, USE CASES:
REQUIREMENTS IN CONTEXT 50 (2000) (suggesting that use cases be used in requests for
proposals to specify desired software behavior).
181. See, e.g., JIM ARLOW & ILA NEUSTADT, UML AND THE UNIFIED PROCESS:
PRACTICAL OBJECT-ORIENTED ANALYSIS AND DESIGN (2001); GRADY BOOCH ET AL., THE
UNIFIED MODELING LANGUAGE USER GUIDE (1998).
182. See, e.g., CONSTANTINE & LOCKWOOD, supra note 175, at 102–03; KULAK &
GUINEY, supra note 180, at 36–37.
183. See CONSTANTINE & LOCKWOOD, supra note 175, at 103.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 102–03.
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strain the design and implementation of the system in any way.186 For
example, user identification may be implemented with voice recognition, thumbprint analysis, or a retinal scan; and choices might be offered through voice synthesis, or conveniently arranged so that the
customer’s usual withdrawal amount is listed most prominently.187
Thus, compared with a use case for a given task, the corresponding
essential use case “is closer to a purely problem-oriented, rather than
solution-oriented, view of the task . . . .”188 Specifically, an essential
use case provides “an abstract, idealized, and technology-free description of a problem with minimal intrusion of assumptions about particular solutions.”189
Figure 2: An Essential Use Case for the Task of Getting Cash From an
ATM190
gettingCash
User Intention
identify self

System Responsibility
verify identity
offer choices

choose
dispense cash
take cash

Essential use cases abstract away implementation details and specific technological solutions, not purposes and problems that are of
intrinsic interest to the user.191 For example, the essential use case of
Figure 2 includes the user self-identification step because such a step
is necessary to determine that a user is the owner of an account before
permitting the user to withdraw cash from that account.
Importantly, an essential use case must describe enough of the interaction to be “complete, meaningful, and well-defined” from the
user’s perspective. It should address at least the following questions
regarding the user’s purpose and intentions in interacting with the
system:
●

What does the user need to be able to do?

186. See id.
187. See id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 108.
190. Id. at 105.
191. See id. at 105 (stating that the essential use case in Figure 2 “includes only those
steps that are essential and of intrinsic interest to the user”).
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What capabilities are required to support whatever the
user is trying to accomplish?
What information will the user need to examine, create,
or change?
What will the user need to be informed of by the system?
What will the user need to inform the system about?192

Because an essential use case completely captures a user purpose
without restricting design, it provides antitrust analysis with an appropriate criterion for deciding whether two software products “can be
used for the same purpose”193 and which software products, in supporting a task that is also supported by the defendant’s product, may
thereby compete with the defendant’s product within the corresponding end-use segment.
Of course, these inquiries into functional interchangeability and
end-use segments represent only some of the relevant considerations
for the delineation of a product market. Product and price differentiation among functionally interchangeable products, and supply substitution by current producers and probable market entrants should also
be examined. Software engineering can provide frameworks for these
analyses as well.
3. Competitive Variables, Metrics and Preconditions
Within the parameters of an essential use case, a task can be implemented by a virtually unlimited variety of design approaches,
thereby giving rise to significant differentiation among functionally
interchangeable software products. Even with respect to differentiated
products, however, if shifts in demand or correlations between prices
or price movements are observed,194 then such products should be
seen as reasonably interchangeable. Otherwise, the product market
definition analysis should examine the products’ “competitive variables”195 — i.e., “the factors that normally determine the choice or
preference of the user.”196
Software engineers have considerable experience with the measurement of software performance and quality, and have identified
those metrics that play significant roles in a user’s evaluation of soft-

192. This is a simplified version of a list of questions appearing in CONSTANTINE &
LOCKWOOD, supra note 175, at 116.
193. United States v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 246 F. Supp. 464, 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
194. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
195. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 42, § 1.11 (1992) (stating that
the DOJ and FTC will consider buyer and seller “response to relative changes in price or
other competitive variables” in defining the relevant product market).
196. Pfizer, 246 F. Supp. at 468.
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ware products.197 Constantine and Lockwood have identified two
categories of software metrics that are relevant to the differentiation
of software products: “preference metrics” (based on subjective user
evaluations of user-system interactions) and “performance metrics”
(based on controlled, systematic testing of user-system interactions).198
Table 1: Aspects of Software Use That May Be Measured By
Preference and Performance Metrics
Preference metrics199

Performance metrics200

Affect

Completeness

Efficiency (subjective)

Correctness

Helpfulness

Effectiveness

Control

Efficiency (objective)

Learnability

Proficiency
Productiveness

A full survey of software metrics is presented in Chapters 17 and
18 of Software for Use and is beyond the scope of this Article.201
Table 1 lists some of the many aspects of software use for which metrics have been developed. Of course, not all of these aspects and metrics will factor into every market definition analysis, and other metrics
may be found relevant to the valuations of software products.202
Courts and parties should examine the relevant evidence to identify
those particular aspects of software use that are material to “the choice
or preference of the user” for a software product to serve a particular
197. See, e.g., TOM GILB, SOFTWARE METRICS (1977); STEPHEN H. KAN, METRICS AND
MODELS IN SOFTWARE QUALITY ENGINEERING (2002).
198. See CONSTANTINE & LOCKWOOD, supra note 175, at 419. A third category of metrics, referred to as either “predictive metrics” or “design metrics,” is used by software developers to evaluate prototypes of software products early in the development process,
rather than finished software products in consumer markets. See id. at 423–42.
199. See CONSTANTINE & LOCKWOOD, supra note 175, at 421.
200. See id. at 454.
201. Id. at 417–62.
202. For example, the emerging theory of “value sensitive design” has identified a number of ethical values that may be considered in evaluating alternative software designs. See
Batya Friedman et al., Value Sensitive Design: Theory and Methods, 4–6 (June 2003) (listing human welfare, ownership and property, privacy, freedom from bias, universal usability,
trust, autonomy, informed consent, accountability, identity, calmness, and environmental
sustainability as “frequently implicated values that we suggest have a distinctive claim on
resources in the design process”), at http://www.ischool.washington.edu/vsd/vsd-theorymethods-draft-june2003.pdf. These values expand on traditional usability concerns, inter
alia, by accounting for the interests of stakeholders in the design of a computer system who
do not use the system themselves (e.g., patients whose histories are stored on a medical
records system, or citizens who are impacted by their fellow citizens’ use of a voting machine). See id. at 3–4.
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purpose, and then to identify those software products that effectively
compete with the defendant’s product with respect to these aspects of
software use.203
Software products that support the same task (as defined by an essential use case) may also vary with respect to their preconditions. In
deciding whether two software products are reasonably interchangeable, courts and parties should determine whether any overlap between their preconditions is broad enough to permit effective
competition between them.204 Where two software products have mutually exclusive preconditions (e.g., incompatible system hardware
requirements), they should be deemed both reasonably and functionally non-interchangeable, even though both may support the same
task.
Relevant documentary evidence for the analysis of metrics and
preconditions may be found in software product marketing studies,
published reviews of the software products, other descriptions of user
experiences with software products, bug reports, software patches,
documentation accompanying software products, and the general
computer science, software engineering, and software consumer literature. Testimonial evidence from computer science and software
engineering experts and software vendors, developers and users, and
demonstrative evidence (e.g., verifying system behavior in the presence of the court) may also be relevant.
4. Price Discrimination Markets
As we have seen, essential use cases can be used to identify enduse segments that are possible targets for (quality-adjusted) price discrimination.205 If a particular end use specifically accounts for some
significant part of the consumer demand for the defendant’s software
product,206 and a hypothetical monopolist of software products supporting the end use would have the legal and technological ability to
reduce the quality of its products significantly below a competitive
level with respect to that end use only,207 then the respective end-use
segment should be deemed a relevant product market. Discrimination
against that end-use segment would be expected to succeed, as a
would-be arbitrageur would be unable to alter the monopolist’s software product so as to restore the product’s quality to a competitive
level with respect to the end use.208
203. See supra text accompanying note 59.
204. See supra text accompanying note 59.
205. See supra Part II.C.2.
206. See supra text accompanying note 111.
207. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 141–144 and accompanying text.
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To prove the technological feasibility of such a strategy, a party
could develop and demonstrate a prototype software product that removes or significantly degrades the ability of the defendant’s product
to support the relevant end use without affecting its performance with
respect to all other end uses. Other relevant evidence would address
the presence or absence of functional or logical relationships among
the software product’s various end uses that would impede discrimination against only one of them. For example, it may be the case that
every service provided by a particular software product’s platform
software is relied upon by multiple complementary application software products, so that any degradation in the platform software relied
upon by one complementary product would entail a similar degradation in service to other complementary products. Also, tasks (as represented by essential use cases) may be interrelated in various ways that
preclude their independent degradation, including by classification, by
extension, by composition, or by affinity.209
5. Supply Substitutability
Once a group of products having reasonable interchangeability of
use has been determined, current producers of these products can be
identified for inclusion in the relevant product market. Under the
Merger Guidelines’ approach to supply substitution, the product market should also include firms that would probably begin producing
these products in response to a price increase, taking into account
“significant sunk costs of entry and exit,” “technological capability,”
and “difficulties in achieving product acceptance, distribution or production.”210
In the software industry, which is generally characterized by high
fixed costs (mostly in research and development to design the product) and near-zero marginal costs of production and distribution,211
there are two principal structural barriers to entry. They are the legal
and technological impediments to designing a product that is functionally and reasonably interchangeable with the products already in
the market (“incumbent products”) and difficulties in achieving product acceptance. In general, the need to commit significant sunk costs
209. See CONSTANTINE & LOCKWOOD, supra note 175, at 109. For a formal description
of these relationships, see id. at 109–15.
210. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 42, § 1.32.
211. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REV.
657, 725 (2001) (“Virtually all the costs of production are in the design of the software and
therefore independent of the amount sold, so that marginal costs are virtually zero.”) (quoting Declaration of Kenneth J. Arrow, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537
(D.D.C. 1997) (No. 94-1564)); Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out
Entrants Are Not Predatory — And the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power,
112 YALE L.J. 681, 710 (2003) (describing software’s marginal cost of production as “near
zero”).
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of research and development will deter entry unless it is expected that
such costs would be recouped through supracompetitive pricing.212
Some other examples of structural impediments are:
a. Interference From Preinstalled Software
An incumbent product that supports a particular task may be designed to interfere with the ability of other software products to support the same task. This may be a rational strategy if the incumbent
product has a sufficiently large installed base that its software has often been preinstalled on a system even when the user has chosen a
different software product to support the task.
In particular, when preinstalled software is designed to support a
task despite a user’s choice of a different software product for that
purpose, the effect of such preinstalled software is to prevent all subsequently acquired software products from supporting the task according to their documented specifications.213 If sufficiently frequent and
severe, the resulting frustration of the user’s intentions may significantly diminish the product quality of the chosen software product,
conferring a structural advantage on the preinstalled software product.
b. Proprietary Platform Software
Where incumbent products serve the purpose of preinstalling platform software for one or more complementary products, an entrant
will typically be able to design a product that serves the same purpose
only if it is legally permissible and technologically possible to emulate the programming interfaces provided by the platform software.
Even when this is possible, it can be a risky, costly, and difficult undertaking.214
c. Exclusionary Preconditions
An incumbent product may have preconditions that require the
system to use proprietary complementary technologies, and may
therefore be incompatible with preconditions of other software products that support the same task. Depending on the existence and extent
of any remaining overlap among the products’ preconditions, proprietary technological requirements can warrant a determination of func212. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 42, § 1.32 (excluding from the
product market any firm that would face “[a] significant sunk cost . . . which would not be
recouped within one year of the commencement of the supply response”).
213. See supra text accompanying note 171.
214. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 22 (D.D.C. 1999) (describing IBM’s unsuccessful effort to clone the Windows platform in 1994 at a cost of “tens of
millions of dollars”).
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tional or reasonable non-interchangeability. For example, a word
processing software product may require as a precondition for use that
any input file be in a certain proprietary document format. A wouldbe competitor may be legally and technologically precluded from developing another word processing software product that works with
the same document format.
D. A First Principles Approach to Market Definition
This section serves to summarize the procedure this Article has
described for defining a relevant product market.
1. Define the Defendant’s Product
A software product is defined by reference to accompanying
software and documentation, and consists essentially of the necessary
legal rights and technological capabilities to install and run the software on a system according to the documentation.215
2. List Relevant Consumer Purposes for the Defendant’s Product
The list should consist of consumer purposes for the defendant’s
product that are relevant to the challenged practice and are complete,
meaningful, and well-defined from the user’s perspective.216 Consumer purposes may include (1) tasks supported by the defendant’s
product, and (2) the satisfaction of preconditions for running other
software products by the acquisition of the defendant’s product and
the preinstallation of its accompanying platform software.217
The list need not include all consumer purposes served by the defendant’s product. Since “functional interchangeability does not require complete identity of use,”218 the list need not be comprehensive,
but might be limited to the product’s primary end use or uses. Alternatively, it may consist of a single end use that could be targeted for
price discrimination where the challenged practice has been alleged to
affect competition among products serving that end use.219 Such price
discrimination is possible, for example, if it specifically accounts for
some significant part of the consumer demand for the product,220 and
if a hypothetical monopolist would have the ability to discriminate

215. See supra Part II.C.1.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 111–171.
217. See supra text accompanying note 171.
218. United States v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 246 F. Supp. 464, 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 104–106.
220. See supra text accompanying note 106.
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against the end use by reducing the quality of the product significantly
below a competitive level with respect to that end use only.221
3. Represent Any Relevant Tasks as Essential Use Cases
Each relevant task should be characterized in the form of an essential use case: a structured narrative, expressed in the language of
the application domain and of users, comprising a simplified, generalized, abstract, technology-free, and implementation-independent description of the user-system interaction that supports the task.222
4. Identify Products That Are Functionally Interchangeable with the
Defendant’s Product for the Relevant Consumer Purposes
A product should be deemed functionally interchangeable with
the defendant’s product if it serves any of the consumer purposes
identified in step 2, as characterized in step 3.223
5. List Relevant Competitive Variables
Competitive variables include material preference and performance metrics with respect to each relevant task, and material preconditions for using the defendant’s product.224 A factor is material if it
would normally determine the user’s choice or preference of a software product for the relevant end use.225
6. Identify Products That Are Reasonably Interchangeable with the
Defendant’s Product for the Relevant Consumer Purposes
The reasonable interchangeability analysis begins with a provisional market consisting of the defendant’s product, and proceeds by
iteratively extending the boundaries of the provisional market to include additional products that are reasonably interchangeable with the
products already found to be in the provisional market.226 A product
identified in step 4 as functionally interchangeable with the defendant’s product is reasonably interchangeable if, given consumer preferences with respect to the competitive variables identified in step 5,
consumers would respond to a quality-adjusted price increase above a
competitive level by a hypothetical monopolist of the provisional
market by switching to the functionally interchangeable product in
221. See supra text accompanying note 134.
222. See supra Part II.C.1.
223. See supra notes 205–210 and accompanying text.
224. See supra Part II.C.3.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 195–196.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 52–57.
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sufficient volume so as to make such a price increase unprofitable.227
This iterative process should continue until no more reasonably interchangeable products can be added to the provisional market.228
7. Identify Structural Barriers to Entry
The software product market definition procedure concludes by
identifying producers that could respond to a price increase above a
competitive level by a hypothetical monopolist of the provisional
market by making and selling any of the incumbent products identified in step 6, or a reasonably interchangeable new product, in sufficient volume so as to make such a price increase unprofitable.229 This
analysis should account for structural barriers to entry into the product
market that may arise from the technological difficulty of designing a
functionally and reasonably interchangeable new product, such as
exclusionary preconditions, proprietary platform software, and interference from preinstalled software,230 as well as difficulties in achieving product acceptance.
E. Well-Functioning Software Product Markets
Quality competition in a software product market has been described here as being located within a space defined by preference and
performance metrics.231 To be precise, the quality of a software product is measured by the degree to which the system on which the product is used is seen to perform its responsibilities satisfactorily in
response to user intentions, as specified by the essential use case(s)
embodying the user purpose(s) that the software product was purchased to support. This description of software product quality coincides with economic conceptions of consumer welfare. A software
product’s full economic cost includes the time and effort required to
use the product for the purpose(s) for which it was purchased. Ease of
use is an economic benefit to consumers.
One of the world’s leading authorities on human-centric product
design, Donald A. Norman, refers to the fundamental problems presented by difficult-to-use systems as “the gulf of execution” and “the
gulf of evaluation.”232 A gulf of execution exists when the user must
expend considerable effort before the system will respond to the
user’s intentions as expected.233 A gulf of evaluation exists when the
227. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
228. See supra text accompanying note 54.
229. See supra Part II.C.5.
230. See supra Part II.C.5.
231. See supra notes 195–204 and accompanying text.
232. DONALD A. NORMAN, THE DESIGN OF EVERYDAY THINGS 49–52 (1988).
233. See id. at 51.
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user must expend considerable effort before the user is able to understand that that the system has responded to the user’s intentions as
expected.234 Drawing on examples from door handles to VCRs, Norman asserts that a failure to address these two problems is responsible
for design defects that impede the usability of a vast number of everyday devices.235 Applying Norman’s concepts to software products, it
is apparent that innovation focused on preference and performance
metrics embodies the pursuit of ease of use.236 When, as the result of
innovation, a software product offers improvements with respect to
one or more preference or performance metrics, the system on which
the product is used will exhibit reductions in the gulfs of execution
and evaluation. Consumers can perceive this ease of use and then
make choices accordingly as to which software products to use for
their desired purposes.237
The ability of the vendor of a software product to respond to consumer demand for quality through design innovation resides in the
vendor’s freedom to choose the code (which may include platform
software) that the system executes in fulfillment of its responsibilities
whenever a consumer chooses to use the software product for any of
the user purposes for which it is sold. This Article will use the term
“well-functioning” to describe a software product market in which
every software vendor has this freedom to innovate in response to
consumer demand. This freedom is necessary not only for consumer
demand to drive competition among software vendors to improve
product quality, but also for software development to proceed according to standard industry practice.
Table 2 outlines the standard development process for a software
product. Within this framework, the specification of user purposes
with essential use cases corresponds to the requirements-gathering
stage (documentation of functions to be performed that are “in the

234. See id. at 51–52.
235. See id. at 34–104 passim.
236. See MICHAEL L. DERTOUZOS, THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 20–24 (2001) (arguing that the first step toward human-centric computing will be the implementation of natural
interaction with machines, wherein “machine actions [will] match our human intent” and
where the system will “let us carry out our intent at our level and with little effort”).
237. This description of consumer behavior assumes that the vendor will provide the consumer with accurate information about the software product’s performance for the consumer’s desired purposes, which is not always the case. See 2 L.J. KUTTEN, COMPUTER
SOFTWARE: PROTECTION/LIABILITY/LAW/FORMS § 8.01[2], at 8-6 (2001) (“The goal of a
salesman is to sell the software as quickly as possible. And unfortunately the product has to
be sold whether or not it fits the user’s needs.”). To the extent that the choice of a software
product may be made on the basis of material misinformation, however, the appropriate
remedy would normally be furnished by commercial law rather than antitrust. See generally
CEM KANER & DAVID L. PELS, BAD SOFTWARE: WHAT TO DO WHEN SOFTWARE FAILS
(1998) (describing consumer’s remedies under the Uniform Commercial Code for defective
software products).
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users’ language and from the users’ perspective”).238 By definition,
the essential use cases that are the products of the requirementsgathering stage are independent of the software developer’s design
and implementation decisions.
Table 2: Activities in the Standard Software Development Process239
Stage
Requirements
gathering
Analysis
Design
Construction
Testing
Deployment
Maintenance

Description
Gather and document the functions that the application
should perform for the users in the users’ language and
from the users’ perspective.
Build a logical solution that satisfies the requirements but
does not necessarily take hardware constraints into account.
Adapt the logical solution to satisfy system constraints.
Write, compile, debug, and test code in a programming
environment.
Test code in a complete working system. Fix problems
and obtain user acceptance.
Deliver code and documentation. Install code on machines and train users.
Make changes to the working system to fix new problems
and adapt to ongoing changes in technology and customer needs.

In subsequent stages, the developer is called upon to make increasingly specific decisions about the design and implementation of
the software product, culminating in the creation of deliverable code
and documentation. Each of these stages is predicated on the expectation that the developer will be free to choose the code that is to be
executed when the software product is chosen. Thus, in the analysis
and design stages, the developer expects that the logical solution being created (including the system’s user interface as specified by an
implementation-specific use case) 240 will be amenable to implementation through construction, testing, deployment, and maintenance. In
the construction, testing, and deployment stages, the developer expects that the system being created and installed will respond to user
requests by executing the code exactly as the developer has written
and compiled it. Finally, in the maintenance stage, the developer expects that any fixes and adaptations to the code will be fully reflected
in changes to the behavior of the system.
238. See KULAK & GUINEY, supra note 180, at 34–38 (explaining the role of “contextfree” (i.e., implementation-independent) use cases in requirements gathering).
239. See id. at 5; see also Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright, Computer Software, and the New
Protectionism, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 33, 38 & n.8 (1987) (describing a similar “process of
program creation” performed by software engineers).
240. See supra notes 179–190 and accompanying text.
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The code that is executed when the software product is used may,
at the developer’s option, incorporate platform software that has been
preinstalled on the system prior to the deployment stage.241 Among
the decisions to be made by the developer during the design stage is
the determination of which platform software, if any, is assumed to
have been preinstalled. During the construction and testing stages, the
developer then has the option of incorporating some of this platform
software by reference into the code that is to be executed when the
software product is used — i.e., by making calls to the appropriate
programming interfaces in the platform software. It bears emphasizing
that the developer’s freedom to choose which code is to be executed is
not affected in any way by the provenance of platform software. Although the developer typically is not the author of the platform software, the developer defines the context and scope of its incorporation
into the software, and thereby retains ultimate responsibility and control over which code is to be executed when the software product is
used.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the need for careful consideration of the distinctive role and structure of the software development process as a basis for competition in a well-functioning
software product market. Antitrust analysis should specifically recognize the potential anticompetitive effects of any legal or technological
impediments to a developer’s freedom to choose which code is to be
executed when a consumer chooses to use the developer’s product. If
sufficiently severe, such impediments should be regarded as a barrier
to entry in defining the relevant product market.242
The antitrust analysis of alleged injuries to competition in software product markets requires a rigorous examination of another distinctive characteristic of software products. Namely, the sale of a
software product does not confer fee simple title to the accompanying
software code, but instead allocates various limited legal rights between the vendor and the consumer under the terms of a software license.243 As I will explain in Part III, statutory and judicially-created
limitations on copyright exclusivity serve in this context to support
well-functioning software product markets.

III. COPYRIGHT EXCLUSIVITY IN
SOFTWARE PRODUCT MARKETS
Software licensing, like other contracting activities, may constitute exclusionary practices that trigger antitrust scrutiny. In such
cases, antitrust liability can turn on whether the practices in question
241. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
242. See supra text accompanying note 214.
243. See infra Part III.
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are deemed to be a legitimate exercise of rights that were lawfully
acquired under the federal copyright laws.244 This issue is especially
significant in software product markets because mass market software
licenses frequently purport to extend the vendor’s rights beyond the
scope of the copyright grant.245
The Copyright Act of 1976246 defines the scope of copyright protection in two respects. First, it identifies the elements of a work that
are eligible subject matter for copyright protection. Second, it identifies and limits the exclusive and exclusionary rights that are granted to
the owner of copyright in a work with respect to these elements.
These rights and limitations constitute the basic framework within
which authors and other rights holders control and exploit their works.
Increasingly, however, software products are marketed to consumers under terms and conditions that purport to extend the vendor’s
rights beyond the scope defined by the Copyright Act.247 As many
commentators have noted, these transactional practices may have the
effect of overriding the balance of public policy interests embodied in
the federal copyright statute.248 Of particular concern in the antitrust
244. See, e.g., United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 47–48 (1962) (condemning the
block booking of separately copyrighted motion pictures for television exhibition as a tying
arrangement under § 1 of the Sherman Act); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203
F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (rejecting unilateral refusal to license claim for lack of
evidence that copyrights were obtained by unlawful means or were used to gain monopoly
power beyond the statutory copyright granted by Congress); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman
Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994) (“[W]hile exclusionary conduct can
include a monopolist's unilateral refusal to license a copyright, an author's desire to exclude
others from use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively valid business justification for
any immediate harm to consumers.”); Montgomery County Ass’n of Realtors, Inc. v. Realty
Photo Master Corp., 878 F. Supp. 804, 817 & n.23 (D. Md. 1995), aff’d, 91 F.3d 132 (4th
Cir. 1996) (holding that a copyright owner’s refusal to license the copying of its database
was authorized by § 106 of the Copyright Act, and was therefore a “legitimate business
purpose” negating the claim of concerted refusal to deal claim); see generally 1
HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED
TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 13.3, at 13-10 (2003) (stating that antitrust law generally imposes a duty to license intellectual property only in cases where “an intellectual
property owner has sought to expand the scope of its right beyond what the intellectual
property laws grant it”).
245. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
“shrinkwrap” license agreement that overrode limitations on the copyright owner’s rights
under the Copyright Act was enforceable under Wisconsin contract law).
246. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2004).
247. See ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447.
248. There is an extensive literature on the preemption of state contract law by federal
copyright law and the enforceability of shrinkwrap and clickwrap license agreements; i.e.,
standard form license agreements that assert that the act of opening a box, or downloading
files, containing software signifies the consumer’s assent to the license terms. For commentary on preemption, see, for example, Maureen A. O’Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE
L.J. 479 (1995). For commentary on shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements, see, for example, Garry L. Founds, Note, Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap Agreements: 2B or Not 2B?, 52
FED. COMM. L.J. 99 (1999); Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and OnLine Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 511 (1997); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property
and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995); Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps
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context is the balance between the constitutional purpose to “promote
the Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings”249 and the
Sherman Act’s “general prohibition on unreasonable restraints of
trade.”250
In addressing this balance, antitrust doctrine draws a fundamental
distinction between trade restraints that inhere in the rights conferred
by the intellectual property laws, and trade restraints that result from
the contractual or technological exploitation of those rights. While
intellectual property rights themselves may restrain competition by
subjecting competing suppliers to civil liability for certain kinds of
productive activities (i.e., those involving infringement), the legitimate acquisition and enforcement of rights under the intellectual
property laws are generally not subject to antitrust scrutiny.251 Transactions involving intellectual property rights, however, may be subject
to antitrust challenge based on the owner’s conduct in exploiting those
rights through contractual or technological means.252 In United States
v. Microsoft Corp., the D.C. Circuit provided perhaps the most vivid
statement of this distinction.253 In affirming the district court’s dismissal of Microsoft’s copyright counterclaim, the appellate court reasoned that Microsoft’s contention that the exercise of lawfully
acquired intellectual property rights cannot give rise to antitrust liability “is no more correct than the proposition that use of one’s personal
property, such as a baseball bat, cannot give rise to tort liability.”254
A comprehensive survey of the antitrust analysis of specific intellectual property transactional practices is beyond the scope of this
Article.255 The more limited purposes of Part III are to clarify the role
in Cyberspace, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 311 (1995); Apik Minassian, The Death of Copyright:
Enforceability of Shrinkwrap Licensing Agreements, 45 UCLA L. REV. 569 (1997).
249. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
250. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. U.S., 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953).
251. See generally HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 244 §§ 13.1–13.2, at 13-2 to 13-10
(2003) (explaining that the antitrust laws generally permit the lawful owners of intellectual
property to enforce and refuse to license their rights); cf. Feb. 22, 2000 A.M. Session Trial
Transcript at 28, United States v. Microsoft. Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (No.
98-1232) (statement by Jackson, J.) (stating that Copyright Act “gives you, for all practical
purposes, fee simple control over that code”), available at 2000 WL 215541.
252. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit v. U.S., 306 U.S. 208, 230 (1939) (“An agreement illegal
because it suppresses competition is not any less so because the competitive article is copyrighted.”); Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1185 n.63
(1st Cir. 1994) (“It is in any event well settled that concerted and contractual behavior that
threatens competition is not immune from antitrust inquiry simply because it involves the
exercise of copyright privileges.”); cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504
U.S. 451, 479 n.29 (1992) (“The Court has held many times that power gained through
some natural and legal advantage such as a patent, copyright, or business acumen can give
rise to liability if ‘a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire
into the next.’” (citations omitted)).
253. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
254. Id. at 63.
255. The leading treatise in this area is HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 244.
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of copyright in defining the legal rights that comprise a software
product and to derive generally applicable principles for determining
whether an alleged restraint on competition in software product markets exceeds the scope of the exclusionary rights granted by the Copyright Act. In Parts III.A and III.B, respectively, this Article will
explain how the Copyright Act defines the scope of copyrightable
expression in software and the scope of the copyright owner’s substantive rights with respect to that copyrightable expression.
A. The Scope of Copyrightable Subject Matter
It is settled law that the Copyright Act extends protection at least
to the software code256 that accompanies a software product. Section
102(a) expressly provides copyright protection to “original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium,” including literary, musical,
dramatic, choreographic, pictorial, graphic, sculptural, audiovisual,
recorded audio, and architectural works.257 A work is fixed in a tangible medium when its embodiment in a copy “is sufficiently permanent
or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”258 Literary
works are defined as “works, other than audiovisual works, expressed
in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia.”259
Software code is expressed in “verbal or numerical symbols or
indicia,” and is therefore considered a “literary work” within the
meaning of the Copyright Act.260 The software code that accompanies
a software product is fixed in a tangible medium insofar as it is distributed in a form that at least permits its reproduction in the random
access memory (“RAM”) of the user’s computer.261 Copyright law
thus prohibits at least the unauthorized literal copying of software
code associated with simple forms of software piracy, such as the duplication of software CD-ROMs or diskettes.
The Copyright Act is less clear, however, regarding the eligibility
of nonliteral elements of software for copyright protection. Section
102(b) of the Copyright Act expressly denies copyright protection to
256. See supra note 164.
257. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2004).
258. Id. § 101.
259. Id.
260. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 838–39 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (finding that computer programs fall within the terms of the Copyright Act, but noting
that § 102(b) limits protection to “the expression adopted by the programmer” and excludes
“the actual processes or methods embodied in the program”).
261. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517–18 (9th Cir. 1993)
(finding that copies of software in random access memory can be “perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration” within the meaning
of § 101).
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ideas, procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts,
principles, and discoveries.262 In general, this provision serves to codify the longstanding rule that “copyright does not protect ideas, but
only expression of ideas,”263 also known as the “idea/expression dichotomy.”264 The purpose of the idea/expression dichotomy is to balance competing constitutional values by placing the original
expressions of authors within the scope of copyrightable subject matter while preserving the public’s First Amendment interest in the free
communication of ideas.265
Although the idea/expression dichotomy is well-settled as a matter of principle,266 it has been difficult for courts to apply in practice,
particularly in cases involving functional works.267 In such cases, the
aim is to preserve “the balance between competition and protection
reflected in the patent and copyright laws.”268 With respect to software, the idea/expression dichotomy stands for the principle that
copyright in a computer program should not prevent another developer from writing different code that performs the same functions as
the copyrighted program when executed. Thus, § 102(b) serves “to
make clear that the expression adopted by the programmer is the
copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the actual
processes or methods embodied in the program are not within the
scope of copyright law.”269

262. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2004).
263. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986).
264. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5670 (“Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the scope of copyright protection
under the present law. Its purpose is to restate . . . that the basic dichotomy between expression and idea remains unchanged.”).
265. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556–57 (1985)
(noting that the dichotomy “strike[s] a definitional balance between the First Amendment
and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an
author’s expression” (citation omitted)); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communications Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting that the dichotomy
“balance[s] the important First Amendment rights with the constitutional authority for
‘promoting the progress of the science and useful arts’” (citations omitted)).
266. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991) (stating that
the dichotomy “applies to all works of authorship”); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
267. See, e.g., John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 119, 121–29 (1991) (arguing that the dichotomy has become an “incoherent” doctrine
that “announces results but does not determine or justify them”).
268. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir.
1983) (quoting Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir.
1971)).
269. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670;
S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 54 (1975). Several of the federal circuit courts have referred to this
legislative history in discerning the purpose of § 102(b). See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v.
Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 836–37 (10th Cir. 1993); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo
of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 838–39 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai,
Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703 (2d Cir. 1992); M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421,
434–35 (4th Cir. 1986); Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1252–53.
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In effect, the § 102(b) inquiry requires courts to attach legal significance to the subtle distinction between a programmer’s expression
in the “verbal or numerical symbols or indicia” of a computer program270 and the “processes or methods embodied in the program.”271
As a result, courts have historically taken widely divergent approaches toward copyright infringement cases in which the defendant
has not literally copied the plaintiff’s code, but has duplicated other
elements of the plaintiff’s software, such as its structure, sequence,
organization, hardware interfaces, programming interfaces, user interfaces, and “look and feel.”
1. Whelan v. Jaslow
A 1986 decision by the Third Circuit, Whelan Associates, Inc. v.
Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.,272 provided the first thorough analysis of this issue. In the case, the defendant Jaslow had hired Whelan to
develop a custom computer program for dental laboratory recordkeeping that required the particular platform software that had been
preinstalled on Jaslow’s machines.273 Jaslow subsequently developed
and marketed another program for use by other dental laboratories
that served essentially the same function as Whelan’s program, but
was based on more widely available platform software.274 Whelan
sued Jaslow for copyright infringement. After a bench trial, the district court credited the testimony of Whelan’s expert, who had found
similarities between the file structures used, the screen outputs produced, and some of the subroutines called by both programs.275 Based
on these substantial similarities and Jaslow’s prior access to Whelan’s
program, the district court inferred that Jaslow had actually copied the
common elements from Whelan’s program.276 Noting that the copyrightable expression in a computer program includes not only its code,
but also “the manner in which the program operates, controls and
regulates the computer,” the district court concluded that Jaslow had
committed copyright infringement by copying expression from Whelan’s program.277
On appeal to the Third Circuit, Jaslow argued that the two programs were not substantially similar as a matter of law, because the
district court did not find any similarity between their versions of
270. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
271. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670;
S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 54 (1975).
272. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
273. Id. at 1225–26.
274. Id. at 1226.
275. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1321–22 (E.D. Pa.
1985).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1320–22.
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code.278 Rejecting this argument, the appeals court drew an analogy
between the “structures” of computer programs and the copyrightable
“plot[s] or plot devices” of literary works,279 and held that this analogy governed the scope of copyright in computer programs.280 Applying the idea/expression dichotomy to software, the court concluded
that the unprotectable idea of a program is simply “the purpose or
function” of the program, and that the protectable expression in a
computer program includes not only its code, but “everything that is
not necessary to . . . [its] purpose or function.”281 In this analysis, the
copyrightability of a software element turns on the availability of
functionally equivalent alternatives. The court stated, “Where there
are various means of achieving the desired purpose, then the particular
means chosen is not necessary to the purpose; hence, there is expression, not idea.”282 The appellate court found that the purpose of Whelan’s program was “the efficient organization of a dental
laboratory,”283 and that the particular “detailed structure” of Whelan’s
program, not being necessary to that purpose, was protectable expression.284 Accordingly, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s
judgment of copyright infringement based on the substantial similarity
between the “structure, sequence, and organization” of the two programs.285
Even though the elements of software structure at issue in Whelan
were found to be copyrightable, the Third Circuit noted in a footnote
that in other contexts, elements of software structure and organization
might be found to be unprotectable ideas:
We do not mean to imply that the idea or purpose
behind every utilitarian or functional work will be
precisely what it accomplishes, and that structure and
organization will therefore always be part of the expression of such works. The idea or purpose behind a
utilitarian work may be to accomplish a certain function in a certain way, and the structure or function of
a program might be essential to that task. There is no
suggestion in the record, however, that the purpose
of the [Whelan] program was anything so refined; it
278. 797 F.2d at 1233.
279. Id. at 1234.
280. Id. at 1238.
281. Id. at 1236.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 1240; see also id. at 1236 n.28 (“the idea . . . was the efficient management of
a dental laboratory”); id. at 1238 (“the purpose . . . was to aid in the business operations of a
dental laboratory”).
284. Id. at 1238–39.
285. Id. at 1248.
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was simply to run a dental laboratory in an efficient
way.286
Despite this dictum, Whelan has generally been read as standing
for the proposition that “only one ‘idea,’ in copyright law terms, underlies any computer program, and that once a separable idea can be
identified, everything else must be expression.”287 As a result, the
Whelan court’s approach to the scope of copyrightable subject matter
in software has been widely rejected by most courts outside the Third
Circuit288 and numerous commentators.289 Even so, Whelan remains
good law in the Third Circuit,290 and continues to be cited elsewhere
for the settled proposition that some non-literal elements of software
structure, sequence, and organization may be copyrightable subject
matter.291
2. Computer Associates v. Altai
In a 1992 case, Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai,
Inc., the Second Circuit took a contrasting approach to the
idea/expression dichotomy.292 The plaintiff in this case, Computer
286. Id. at 1238 n.34 (citation omitted).
287. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 705 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting 3 MELVIN B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[F], at 1362.34) (2003).
288. See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 840 (10th Cir.
1993); Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 705; Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510, 1524–25 (9th Cir. 1992); Plains Cotton Co-Op Ass’n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv.,
Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir. 1987).
289. See, e.g., NIMMER, supra note 287; Michael A. Jacobs, Copyright and Compatibility, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 91, 103 (1989); Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1074 & 1082–83
(1989); David Nimmer et al., A Structured Approach to Analyzing the Substantial Similarity
of Computer Software in Copyright Infringement Cases, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625, 629–30
(1988); Cary S. Kappel, Copyright Protection of SSO: Replete with Internal Deficiencies
and Practical Dangers, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 699, 707–08 (1991); Steven R. Englund,
Note, Idea, Process or Protected Expression?: Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MICH. L. REV. 866, 881 (1990); Thomas M.
Gage, Note, Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories: Copyright Protection for
Computer Software Structure – What's the Purpose?, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 859, 860–61
(1987); Amaury Cruz, Comment, What’s the Big Idea Behind the Idea-Expression Dichotomy? – Modern Ramifications of the Tree of Porphyry in Copyright Law, 18 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 221, 246–47 (1990); Mark T. Kretschmer, Note, Copyright Protection for Software
Architecture: Just Say No!, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 823, 824–27 (1988).
290. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d
197, 206 & 214–16 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Whelan as principal authority for copyright infringement test, but acknowledging defenses available under the Computer Associates line
of cases); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203, 215 (D. Mass. 1992)
(“Whelan remains good authority in the Third Circuit and may provide guidance for this
court.”).
291. See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 840–41; Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 702–
03.
292. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
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Associates (“CA”), had developed an application program, CASCHEDULER, for use with three operating system platforms for IBM
System 370 mainframe computers.293 Rather than develop three separate and distinct versions of the entire program for each operating system, CA divided CA-SCHEDULER into two components: “a first
component that contain[ed] only the task-specific portions of the program” and “a second component that contain[ed] all the interconnections between the first component and the operating system.”294 CA
developed three versions of the second component, one for each IBM
operating system, to serve as an interface between the first component
and the different IBM operating systems.295 This second component,
called ADAPTER, served as a middleware layer296 between the first
component and each of the three different operating system platforms.297 Thus CA needed to develop only one version of the first
component to complete the development of CA-SCHEDULER.
Altai, a competitor of CA, had developed a similar application
program for use with only one of the IBM operating systems.298 Seeking to adapt the program for use with other operating systems, Altai
undertook to develop a component called OSCAR that, like
ADAPTER, would provide a common programming interface to different operating systems.299 Altai hired a CA employee to develop the
component, who later admitted to copying approximately thirty percent of OSCAR’s code from ADAPTER.300 After Altai began licensing the OSCAR component in its software products, CA sued Altai
for copyright infringement.301
Altai responded to the lawsuit by developing a revised version of
OSCAR in which all of the copied sections of code were rewritten by
programmers who did not have access to ADAPTER and had not been
involved in the development of the original version of OSCAR.302
Altai admitted that the original version of OSCAR infringed CA’s
copyright in ADAPTER,303 but argued at trial that CA had failed to
show a substantial similarity between the revised version of OSCAR
and the copyrightable elements of ADAPTER.304 The district court

293. See id. at 698.
294. Id. at 699.
295. See id.
296. See supra Part II.C.1.
297. See Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 699.
298. See id.
299. See id. at 699–700.
300. See id.
301. See id. at 700.
302. See id.
303. See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 560 (E.D.N.Y.
1991).
304. See id. at 561–62.
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agreed, and concluded that the revised version of OSCAR did not infringe CA’s copyright in ADAPTER.305
In its appeal to the Second Circuit, CA argued that the district
court should have found copyright infringement due to substantial
similarities between the second version of OSCAR and certain protected structural elements of ADAPTER.306 In addressing these arguments, the Second Circuit agreed with the Whelan court that copyright
protection may extend to some non-literal elements of a computer
program,307 but rejected the Whelan court’s approach to the
idea/expression dichotomy in favor of a three-step analytical procedure:308
1. Abstraction: “[D]issect the allegedly copied program’s structure and isolate each level of abstraction contained within it. This
process begins with the code and ends with an articulation of the program’s ultimate function.”309
2. Filtration: “[S]eparat[e] protectable expression from nonprotectable material. This process entails examining the structural
components at each level of abstraction to determine whether their
particular inclusion at that level was ‘idea’ or was dictated by considerations of efficiency, so as to be necessarily incidental to that idea;
required by factors external to the program itself; or taken from the
public domain and hence is nonprotectable expression.”310 Filtering
the “structural components . . . required by factors external to the program”311 may exclude from copyright protection those elements in
which the “freedom of design choice”312 available to the developer of
the allegedly infringed program was “circumscribed by extrinsic considerations such as (1) the mechanical specifications of the computer
on which a particular program is intended to run; (2) compatibility
requirements of other programs with which a program is designed to
operate in conjunction; (3) computer manufacturers’ design standards;
(4) demands of the industry being serviced; and (5) widely accepted
programming practices within the computer industry.”313
3. Comparison: Determine “whether the defendant copied any aspect of [the remaining] protected expression,” and assess “the copied

305. See id. at 562.
306. See Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 702.
307. See id.
308. See id. at 706.
309. Id. at 707.
310. Id. (citing 3 NIMMER, supra note 287, § 13.03[F]; Kretschmer, supra note 289, at
844–45).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 709.
313. Id. at 709–10 (citing 3 NIMMER, supra note 287, § 13.03[F][3], at 13-66 to 13-71).
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portion’s relative importance with respect to the plaintiff’s overall
program.”314
Table 3: The Second Circuit’s Analysis of the Similarities Between
Elements of ADAPTER and the Revised Version of OSCAR
Level of Abstraction
Program code
Programming
interface

Similar Elements
“Virtually no lines
of code”315
“Parameter lists
and macros”316

Calls to operating
system

“Overlap . . .
between the list of
services required”
for the operating
system 318

General organization

Similarities
between the
programs’ organizational charts
that were “simple
and obvious to
anyone exposed to
the operation of
the program[s]”320

Rationale for Filtration
N/A
All but a few “were either in
the public domain or dictated
by the functional demands of
the program”317
List of services was “determined by the demands of the
operating system and of the
application program to which
it [was] to be linked through
ADAPTER or OSCAR”319
Similar elements “follow
naturally from the work’s
theme rather than from the
author’s creativity,” and
therefore belong to the
public domain321

Reviewing the trial record, the appeals court found that the district court had made sufficient factual findings to provide a rationale
for filtering out (i.e., finding uncopyrightable) each of the similar
elements between ADAPTER and the revised version of OSCAR.322
The district court had identified four levels of abstraction: the program code,323 the programming interface,324 the calls made to the op314. Id. at 710 (citing 3 NIMMER, supra note 287, § 13.03[F][5]; Data East USA, Inc. v.
Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1988)).
315. Id. at 714 (quoting Computer Assocs., 775 F. Supp. at 561).
316. Id.
317. Id. (quoting Computer Assocs., 775 F. Supp. at 562).
318. Id. at 715.
319. Id. (quoting Computer Assocs., 775 F. Supp. at 562).
320. Id.
321. Id. (quoting 3 NIMMER, supra note 287, § 13.03[F][3], at 13-65).
322. See id. at 714–15.
323. See id. at 714 (identifying “object code” and “source code” as abstractions); see also
supra note 164. The distinction between object code and source code was not of significance to the analysis in Computer Associates and so will not be discussed here.
324. See Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 714 (identifying “parameter lists”). As used here,
parameter lists refer to the calling conventions that are specified by the programming interface of a software component.
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erating system,325 and the general organization of the program.326 As
Table 3 summarizes, the district court had also determined that at each
of these levels, all or almost all of the similar elements between
ADAPTER and the revised version of OSCAR were either “required
by factors external to the program” or “taken from the public domain.”327 Accordingly, the Second Circuit concluded that the district
court properly found that there was no substantial similarity between
the revised version of OSCAR and the protectable expression in
ADAPTER, and affirmed the denial of CA’s copyright infringement
claim with respect to the revised version of OSCAR.328
Although Whelan remains good law in the Third Circuit,329 Computer Associates has been favored throughout the federal courts since
1992.330 In contrast to the widespread criticism of Whelan,331 most
commentators have praised the abstraction-filtration-comparison approach of Computer Associates,332 and some have come close to describing the Second Circuit’s approach as superseding that of the
Third Circuit.333 It is therefore reasonable to expect that, for the fore325. See id. (identifying “services required”). As used here, services required refer to the
calls made by ADAPTER to other software components; i.e., the operating system.
326. See id. (identifying “general outline”).
327. These characteristics of elements of a program are discussed in step two of the
court’s three-step analytic procedure for determining whether copyright extends to nonliteral elements of a computer program. See id. at 702.
328. See id. at 715.
329. See supra note 291.
330. See, e.g., Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Scientific Communications, Inc., 118 F.3d
955 (2d Cir. 1997); MiTek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng’g Co., Inc., 89 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir.
1996); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996); Eng’g Dynamics, Inc.
v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335 (5th Cir. 1994); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando
Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993); Autoskill Inc. v. National Educ. Support
Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1993); Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
331. See supra note 290.
332. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Copyright Law Professors, Lotus Dev. Corp. v.
Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995) (endorsing Computer Associates approach),
reprinted in 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 657 (1994); David Bender, Computer Associates v. Altai: Rationality Prevails, COMPUTER LAWYER, Aug. 1992, at 1; Douglas Derwin,
It is Time to Put “Look and Feel” Out to Pasture, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 605
(1993); Aram Dobalian, Comment, Copyright Protection for the Non-Literal Elements of
Computer Programs: The Need for Compulsory Licensing, 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 1019,
1073 (1994); Stephen H. Eland, Note, The Abstraction-Filtration Test: Determining NonLiteral Copyright Protection for Software, Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai,
Inc., 39 VILL. L. REV. 665, 699 (1994). But see, e.g., Jack E. Brown, “Analytical Dissection” of Copyrighted Computer Software — Complicating the Simple and Confounding the
Complex, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 801 (1993); Anthony L. Clapes & Jennifer M. Daniels, Revenge
of the Luddites: A Closer Look at Computer Associates v. Altai, COMPUTER LAWYER, Nov.
1992, at 11.
333. See, e.g., JONATHAN BAND & MASANOBU KATOH, INTERFACES ON TRIAL:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & INTEROPERABILITY IN THE GLOBAL SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 130
(1995) (stating that Computer Associates “buried Whelan’s . . . analysis”); Peter S. Menell,
Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63 (stating that the
approach “has been universally adopted by the courts since 1992”).
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seeable future, Computer Associates will control the § 102(b) inquiry
in most if not all determinations as to whether a defendant’s software
copyright provides a warrant for conduct challenged under the antitrust laws.
3. Toward a Marketplace of § 102(b) “Idea[s]”
In its Computer Associates decision, the Second Circuit aspired to
develop a “pragmatic” procedure for identifying copyrightable elements in software “which also keeps in consideration ‘the preservation of the balance between competition and protection.’”334 To the
extent that this conception of competition is understood as disfavoring
legal barriers to entry into the software product markets described in
Part II, the court has largely succeeded. By denying copyright protection to program elements where “a programmer’s freedom of design
choice is . . . circumscribed by extrinsic considerations,”335 the Computer Associates filter supports a well-functioning software product
market by removing legal impediments to quality competition in
every product market in which a software product competes, while
still allowing the expressive elements in the product’s accompanying
software to obtain full protection.
To engage in quality competition against an incumbent software
product, vendors must be legally and technologically able to develop
products that can achieve a demand substitution response by providing functional interchangeability and desirable preference and performance features.336 To provide functional interchangeability, a
competing software product needs to support the same tasks, and
needs to satisfy, and be satisfied by, the same preconditions as its
counterpart.337 For purposes of competition among software products,
tasks are deemed equivalent if they can be characterized by the same
essential use case — i.e., the same simplified, generalized, abstract,
technology-free, and implementation-independent description of the
user-system interaction supporting the task.338
Computer Associates assures vendors that developing a competing, functionally interchangeable software product that offers desirable performance features, without more, will not give rise to
copyright liability. Under the Second Circuit’s analysis, the mere fact
that a defendant’s software product supports the same essential use
cases, satisfies and is satisfied by the same preconditions, and exhibits
(at least) the same performance metrics as the plaintiff’s product is not
334. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 711 (quoting Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983)).
335. Id. at 709.
336. See supra Part II.C.3.
337. See supra text accompanying note 217.
338. See supra text accompanying note 222.
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a sufficient basis for a finding of copyright infringement. First, any
similarities between the essential use cases supported by the two programs should be analyzed at the highest level of abstraction and, inasmuch as they describe the general organization of the programs’
behavior in a manner that is “simple and obvious to anyone exposed
to the operation of the program[s],” should be deemed to belong to the
public domain.339 Second, any similarities between the programs’ satisfying and satisfied preconditions should be analyzed at the programming interface level, and deemed to be “dictated by the
functional demands of the program[s].”340 Finally, to the extent that
any similarities in the completeness, correctness, effectiveness, (objective) efficiency, proficiency and/or productiveness of the two programs are attributable to structural components at any level of
abstraction, they should be deemed to be dictated by either “the functional demands of the program[s]” or “considerations of efficiency.”341
While software elements dictated by performance metrics should
be considered “ideas” under § 102(b), software elements dictated by
preference metrics may, in some circumstances, qualify as copyrightable “expressions.” The Computer Associates filter thus immunizes
software quality competition with respect to objective but not subjective measures of usability. This distinction represents a pragmatic
“balance between competition and protection.”342 On one hand, an
expressive software element will not be denied copyright protection
merely because many consumers subjectively see it as attractive. On
the other hand, copyright will not impede the competition among
software developers to improve the objectively measured usability of
functionally interchangeable software, which is the primary challenge
in the development of a marketable software product.343 In short, the
idea/expression dichotomy, as codified in § 102(b) of the Copyright
Act and interpreted by the Second Circuit in the software development setting, is fully compatible both with the grant of exclusivity
over expressive software elements and with competition in a wellfunctioning marketplace of § 102(b) “idea[s].”

339. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 715.
340. Id. at 714.
341. Id. at 700.
342. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir.
1983) (quoting Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir.
1971)).
343. See, e.g., CONSTANTINE & LOCKWOOD, supra note 175, at 518 (“It is almost always
far easier to make a functional but unaesthetic system attractive than to take an attractive but
impractical system and make it work. In other words, design for use comes first. Marketability and artistry are not necessarily of lesser import, but they are better achieved by dealing
with them in turn.”).
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B. The Copyright Act’s Allocation of Rights
The ability of a consumer to use a software product depends not
only on the development of usable software,344 but on the legal rights
that constitute the software product itself, as defined by the terms of
the accompanying software license. Most of these license terms track
the Copyright Act’s default allocation of rights, either by granting to
the user certain nonexclusive rights within the scope of the copyright
owner’s exclusive rights or by leaving the default allocation unchanged.345 Violations of such license terms may constitute both a
contractual breach and a copyright infringement.346 Other license
terms, however, purport to enlarge the scope of the copyright owner’s
rights under the Copyright Act. These terms are enforceable, if at all,
under state contract law, and may be subject to preemption by federal
intellectual property law.347 They may also be susceptible to challenge
under the antitrust laws to the extent that they exceed the legitimate
exercise of a copyright owner’s exclusionary rights.348 In addition,
software license agreements usually contain terms other than those
relating to rights in the software, such as warranties, limitations of
liability, and choice of law.349 Such terms are regarded as independent
contractual covenants; they do not bear on the scope of the license and
are enforceable only under contract law and not copyright law.350
Contractual variations aside, the Copyright Act’s default allocation of rights supports the marketing of expressive works by providing
copyright owners with various exclusive rights that can be licensed,
including the right to copy. The value of a software product to a consumer, however, does not subsist primarily in the right to copy the
accompanying software, but in the right to run it on a computer system. It turns out that this right to run software embraces an intricate
combination of rights and defenses under the Copyright Act, which
needs to be precisely understood.

344. See supra Part II.E.
345. See O’Rourke, supra note 248, at 490 (noting that “with few exceptions, . . . [software license] terms track those of the Copyright Act”).
346. See, e.g., S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1989) (“A licensee infringes the owner’s copyright if its use exceeds the scope of its license.”).
347. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2004) (preempting the grant of rights under “the common
law or statutes of any State” that are “equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright”); see also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255,
269–70 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding prohibition against decompilation in a standard form software licensing agreement unenforceable despite contrary state statute because the state
statute “touches upon an area” of federal copyright law).
348. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
349 See O’Rourke, supra note 248, at 490 n.39.
350. See, e.g., Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1121–23 (9th
Cir. 1999).

No. 1]

Antitrust Analysis in Software Product Markets

57

1. The Statutory Grant
Section 106 of the Copyright Act enumerates a bundle of exclusive rights granted to the owner of copyright in a protected work. Of
the six listed rights, three are applicable to software. Specifically, the
owner of copyright in a computer program has the exclusive rights to
reproduce the program himself and to authorize the reproduction of
the program by others,351 to prepare derivative works based upon the
program,352 and to distribute of copies of the program to the public.353
Of these three rights, only the first two — the reproduction right and
the derivative works right — are normally implicated by a consumer’s
use of a software product.
The reproduction right is implicated when a copy of a copyrighted work is created and “fixed” in a “material object[ ] . . . from
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”354 A
copy is “fixed” if it is “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration.”355 The hardware devices and digital
storage media from which software is read and reproduced by a computer system are facially “material object[s]” within the meaning of
the statute.356 Thus, the installation of copyrighted software onto a
computer (typically by copying it from a CD-ROM or floppy disk
onto a hard drive) necessarily creates and fixes a copy of the software
in a machine-readable medium, and therefore implicates the reproduction right.357
A temporary copy of copyrighted code created in random access
memory (“RAM”) prior to its execution by a microprocessor, while
often described as “ephemeral,”358 has also been found to be sufficiently stable to constitute fixation. In MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak
351. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000).
352. See id. § 106(2).
353. See id. § 106(3).
354. Id. § 101 (defining “copies”).
355. Id. (defining “fixed”).
356. See, e.g., Victor F. Calaba, Quibbles ‘N Bits: Making a Digital First Sale Doctrine
Feasible, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 12 (2002) (“[T]here is little question as
to whether a RAM chip is a ‘material object.’”).
357. See, e.g., Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 100 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (“[I]f someone loads validly copyrighted software onto his or her own computer
without the owner's permission, and then uses the software for the principal purposes for
which it was designed, there can be no real doubt that the protected elements of the software
have been copied . . . .”).
358. See, e.g., Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp.
356, 362–63 (E.D. Va. 1994) (holding RAM copy to be a fixation notwithstanding its
“ephemeral or transient” nature); Dan L. Burk, The Trouble With Trespass, 4 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 27, 40 (2000) (“[S]ome courts have moved away from the requirement
of stable, tangible copies and instead affirmed the copyrightability of ephemeral, so-called
‘RAM copies.’”).
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Computer, Inc., it was undisputed that the defendant Peak, a computer
maintenance services firm, had executed MAI’s operating system
software on its customers’ computers and had viewed the software’s
output (“the system error log”), and that these actions necessarily entailed loading the software into the computer’s RAM without MAI’s
authorization.359 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of MAI on its claims of copyright infringement,360 and Peak appealed.361 Describing the system error log as “part of the operating
system,”362 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that inasmuch as Peak had
loaded the software into RAM and was then able to view the system
error log, the RAM copy created by Peak was “fixed” within the
meaning of the Copyright Act.363 Accordingly, the court held that “the
loading of software into the RAM creates a copy under the Copyright
Act.”364
This holding of MAI is questionable because the court’s conclusion that the RAM copy of MAI’s copyrighted program code was capable of being “perceived . . . for a period of more than transitory
duration”365 appears to have been based on the incorrect premise that
the system error log was part of the copyrighted code. Since the court
had found only that Peak had viewed the system error log, not the
code itself, there was no predicate act of perceiving the RAM copy of
the copyrighted work from which to infer that such acts were permitted “for a period of more than transitory duration.”366 Other commentators have also criticized the holding as an unwarranted departure
from prior caselaw and copyright policy.367
Nevertheless, courts, usually without expressly addressing the
fixation requirement, have generally held that the loading of code into
a computer’s memory prior to executing it creates an infringing
“copy” within the meaning of § 106.368 The Information Infrastructure
359. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993).
360. See id. at 517.
361. See id. at 513.
362. Id. at 518.
363. See id.
364. Id. at 519.
365. Id. at 518 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
366. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 547, 550–51 (1997) (noting that MAI “does not discuss the ‘transitory
duration’ prong of the fixation test” (emphasis in original)).
367. See, e.g., Ronald S. Katz & Janet S. Arnold, MAI v. Peak: An Unprecedented Opinion with Sparse Analysis, COMPUTER LAWYER, May 1993, at 19; Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 41–43 (1994); David Nimmer,
Brains and Other Paraphernalia of the Digital Age, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 21–25
(1996).
368. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 1988)
(“[T]he act of loading a program from a medium of storage into a computer's memory creates a copy of the program . . . .”); ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp.
1310, 1332 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (“Loading a computer's memory requires copying of the program from a disk into memory, and that copy is a direct infringement of the copyright.”);
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Task Force369 and the leading copyright treatise370 have also endorsed
the Ninth Circuit’s approach to the fixation issue. The prevailing
view, then, appears to be that the creation of a temporary copy of
copyrighted code in RAM prior to its execution by a microprocessor
implicates the reproduction right of § 106.
2. The § 117 Limitation
As originally enacted in 1976, the modern Copyright Act did not
specifically provide for copyright protection of software. At the time
of enactment, Congress was awaiting the report of the Commission on
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (“CONTU”).371
CONTU had been established in 1974 to study, inter alia, the creation, reproduction, and use of works of authorship “in conjunction
with automatic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, or
transferring information,” and to recommend such statutory provisions as “may be necessary to assure for such purposes access to
copyrighted works, and to provide recognition of the rights of copyright owners.”372 Accordingly, the original § 117 of the Copyright Act
of 1976 provided that rights with respect to these technological uses
of copyrighted works would be governed by the copyright laws in
force just prior to the effective date of the Act.373
In 1978, CONTU issued a final report identifying four policy objectives concerning copyright protection of software works:
1. Copyright should proscribe the unauthorized
copying of these works.
2. Copyright should in no way inhibit the rightful use
of these works.
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (holding that
copying from a diskette into ROM is a copy); Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F.
Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1984) (holding that inputting a program into memory constitutes a
copy).
369. See INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 65 n.204 (1995) (describing MAI court’s reasoning as
“quite unexceptional”).
370. 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.08[A][1],
at 8-122.3 (2003) (“In MAI v. Peak, the fixation in RAM was evidently more than momentary, as it sufficed to permit a user ‘to view the system error log and diagnose the problem
with the computer . . . .’” (quoting MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511,
518 (9th Cir. 1993))).
371. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2004).
372. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, §§ 201(b)(1)(A), 201(c), 88 Stat. 1873,
1873–74; see also NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, FINAL REPORT 4 (1978) (hereinafter CONTU REPORT).
373. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976).
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3. Copyright should not block the development and
dissemination of these works.
4. Copyright should not grant anyone more economic
power than is necessary to achieve the incentive to
create.374
To attain these objectives, CONTU recommended the enactment of a
new § 117, to provide in relevant part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of § 106, it is not an
infringement for the rightful possessor of a copy of a
computer program to make or authorize the making
of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided . . . that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of
the computer program in conjunction with a machine
and that it is used in no other manner . . . .375
In effect, § 117 serves both as a limitation on the exclusive rights
granted under § 106 to the owner of copyright in a computer program,
and as a guarantee of rights to certain other parties who may desire to
use the program. In explaining the rationale for this recommendation,
CONTU noted the concern that using a copyrighted program might
entail creating copies or adaptations despite the contrary wishes of the
copyright owner and explained that the proposed § 117 would ensure
that a person who had rightfully acquired a copy of a program and
who wished to use it would be assured of the benefit of the bargain —
i.e., the right to use the program for the purposes contemplated by the
parties to the acquisition:
Because the placement of a work into a computer is
the preparation of a copy, the law should provide that
persons in rightful possession of copies of programs
be able to use them freely without fear of exposure to
copyright liability . . . . One who rightfully possesses
a copy of a program, therefore, should be provided
with a legal right to copy it to that extent which will
permit its use by that possessor. This would include
the right to load it into a computer . . . .
Because of a lack of complete standardization among
programming languages and hardware in the com374. CONTU REPORT, supra note 372, at 30.
375. Id.
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puter industry, one who rightfully acquires a copy of
a program frequently cannot use it without adapting
it to that limited extent which will allow its use in the
possessor’s computer. The copyright law . . . should
no more prevent such use than it should prevent
rightful possessors from loading programs into their
computers. Thus, a right to make those changes necessary to enable the use for which it was both sold
and purchased should be provided . . . . These rights
would necessarily be more private in nature than the
right to load a program by copying it and could only
be exercised so long as they did not harm the interests of the copyright proprietor . . . . Should proprietors feel strongly that they do not want rightful
possessors of copies of their programs to prepare
such adaptations, they could, of course, make such
desires a contractual matter.376
In its 1980 amendments to the Copyright Act, Congress enacted
CONTU’s legislative recommendations “almost verbatim.”377 There
was one change: for the phrase describing the intended beneficiary of
§ 117, i.e., “the rightful possessor of a copy of a computer program,”
Congress substituted the language “the owner of a copy of a computer
program.”378 No explanation is given for this change. More generally,
the legislative history for the 1980 amendments is “scant,” consisting
only of the statement that the new § 117 “embodies the recommendations of [CONTU] with respect to clarifying the law of copyright of
computer software.”379 Courts have therefore regarded the CONTU
final report as providing the legislative history of § 117.380
a. “Owners” Eligible for Protection
It is not immediately apparent whether a consumer who acquires
a software product is entitled to benefit from § 117 as “the owner of a
copy of a computer program.” The acquisition of a software product
may involve a transfer both of “copyright rights in the software program (intellectual property rights)” and of “rights in the copy of the
program through the material object that embodies the copyrighted

376. Id. at 31–33.
377. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252 (3d Cir.
1983).
378. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976).
379. Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 5, 9 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (quoting H.R.
REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 23 (1980)).
380. See, e.g., id. at 9.
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work (personal property rights).”381 The Copyright Act expressly provides that these two kinds of rights are legally separate and distinct
and that “[t]ransfer of ownership of any material object . . . does not
of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the
object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey property rights in any material object.”382
In cases outside of the mass-market setting, some courts have
conflated the distinction between ownership of copyright interests in
software and ownership of the material object containing a copy of the
software. For example, in MAI v. Peak, discussed above, the Ninth
Circuit stated in a footnote, without further discussion, that “[s]ince
MAI licensed its software, the Peak customers do not qualify as
‘owners’ of the software and are not eligible for protection under
§ 117.”383 The court’s cursory treatment of the “owner of a copy” determination failed to recognize that, in some cases, a licensee of intellectual property rights in software might be deemed to own a copy of
the software through the physical media in which the software was
embodied.384 In effect, the Ninth Circuit’s statement amounted to a
holding that § 117 protected consumers only in those rare instances
where they had rightfully acquired a copy of the software without entering into a “license agreement.”385 Although MAI is still good law in
the Ninth Circuit,386 this aspect of the decision has been widely criticized387 and has subsequently been overruled with respect to machine
381. See Applied Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Icart, 976 F. Supp. 149, 150–51 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
382. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2004).
383. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993). In a
separate case also involving MAI’s software licenses, a district court reasoned that MAI
customers were not eligible for § 117 protection because as licensees, they were “not ‘owners’ of the copyrighted software.” See Advanced Computer Servs. of Michigan, Inc. v. MAI
Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 367 (E.D. Va. 1994) (emphasis added). This was an erroneous
reading of the crucial words “of a copy” out of § 117. See NIMMER, supra note 287,
§ 8.08[B][1], at 8-123.
384. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 1988)
(holding software licensee’s copying of copyrighted software to be non-infringing under
§ 117); Foresight Res. Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006, 1009–10 (D. Kan. 1989)
(finding that defendant’s client, who had obtained plaintiff’s software subject to a license
agreement, was a lawful “owner of a copy” under § 117).
385. See Lothar Determann & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Don’t Judge a Sale by Its License:
Software Transfers Under the First Sale Doctrine in the United States and the European
Community, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 36–37 (2001).
386. See, e.g., Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Exp. Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir.
1995) (following MAI).
387. See, e.g., NIMMER, supra note 287, § 8.08[B][1], at 8-122.8 to 8-123; Trinnie Arriola, Software Copyright Infringement Claims After MAI Systems v. Peak Computer, 69
WASH. L. REV. 405, 419–20, 422–23 (1994); Determann & Fellmeth, supra note 385, at 41;
Katz & Arnold, supra note 367, at 19–20; Katrine Levin, Note, MAI v. Peak: Should Loading Operating System Software Into RAM Constitute Copyright Infringement?, 24 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 649, 668–77 (1994); Carol G. Stovsky, Note, MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc.: Using Copyright Law to Prohibit Unauthorized Use of Computer Software,
56 OHIO ST. L.J. 593, 601–04 (1995); see also DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Com-
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maintenance and repair activities through an amendment to § 117 in
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998.388
The prevailing view today appears to be that the mere fact that a
software transaction takes the form of a license of rights derived from
the vendor’s copyright in the software is immaterial for purposes of
determining the consumer’s eligibility to benefit from § 117. Instead it
is the substance of the consumer’s rights that is determinative.389
For example, in DSC Communications v. Pulse Communications,
Inc., the plaintiff DSC licensed a telecommunications system to various regional Bell operating system companies (“RBOC’s”), which
included an interface card that was designed to download and run
DSC’s software.390 Pulse designed a competing card that also
downloaded DSC’s software.391 After some of DSC’s licensees began
using Pulse’s cards, DSC sued Pulse for, inter alia, contributory infringement of the copyright in DSC’s software.392 Following a jury
trial, Pulse moved for judgment as a matter of law on this claim.393
Finding that the RBOC’s were “owners” under § 117, the district
court concluded that they were entitled to download DSC’s software
onto Pulse’s cards, and granted Pulse’s motion.394
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, DSC challenged the district
court’s conclusion that the RBOC licensees were “owners.”395 Applying Fourth Circuit law, the appeals court acknowledged that licensees
can be “owners” under § 117 and rejected the Ninth Circuit’s analysis
in MAI.396 The court went on, however, to examine the terms of
DSC’s software license agreements, and found that they “severely
limit[ed] the rights of the [licensees] . . . in ways that are inconsistent
with the rights normally enjoyed by owners of copies of software.”397
munications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting Nimmer’s criticism of
MAI).
388. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (2004) (exempting from infringement copies made for purposes of machine maintenance or repair).
389. See, e.g., NIMMER, supra note 287, § 8.08[B][1], at 8-124 (“whether the software
vendor calls its subject contract a ’license’ or a ‘bill of sale’ is immaterial”); Dieterman &
Fellmeth, supra note 385, at 41 (rejecting Ninth Circuit’s approach of allowing “pro forma
labels” to govern whether § 117 applies); see also Telecomm Technical Servs., Inc. v. Siemens Rolm Communications, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1325 & n.20 (N.D. Ga. 1998)
(finding DSC Communications persuasive in view of Nimmer’s criticism of MAI); Applied
Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Icart, 976 F. Supp. 149, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Determination of
whether an agreement transfers ownership of a copy of a computer program requires interpretation of the contract between the parties.”).
390. 170 F.3d 1354, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
391. See id. at 1358.
392. See id. at 1357.
393. Id.
394. See id. at 1359–60.
395. See id. at 1360.
396. Id. (“Plainly, a party who purchases copies of software from the copyright owner
can hold a license under a copyright while still being an ‘owner’ of a copy of the copyrighted software for purposes of section 117.”).
397. Id. at 1361.
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In particular, each of the agreements limited the licensee’s right to
transfer copies of the software to third parties, a right that would have
been guaranteed to an “owner of a copy” of the software under the
“First Sale” doctrine of § 109.398 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the RBOC licensees in this case were not “owners”
under § 117, and reversed the district court’s judgment.399
Nimmer’s copyright treatise has taken issue with the Federal Circuit’s characterization of the DSC license limitations, arguing that
they were directed to the scope of intellectual property in the copyrighted software, and not to the “incidents of ownership [that] could
be exercised over the physical media in which that software was embodied.”400 Nimmer contends that the determination that a consumer
is an “owner of a copy” under § 117 should be based solely on
whether the material object containing the copy is the consumer’s
personal property.401 Following this approach, if the terms of a software license agreement permit the consumer to “repurpose the physical media in which the software was delivered as ‘door jambs,
landfill, or (absent blank floppies in a pinch) deleting the software and
re-using the disks to store vital company documents’” without incurring liability to the vendor, then the consumer should be deemed to
have ownership of a copy of the software through ownership of the
physical media in which it was embodied.402
According to Lothar Determann and Aaron Fellmeth, a consumer’s eligibility both to make copies and adaptations of software
under § 117 and to transfer copies of software under § 109 should be
based on the overall “sales character” of the transaction under commercial law.403 Thus, if the transaction does not involve either “an
assignment of the copyright itself (sale of the copyrights) or a lease of
the individual copy (lease of a software copy) . . . then the transaction
seems to be properly characterized as a sale of a software copy, which
should trigger the ‘First Sale’ doctrine of section 117.”404 In reviewing
license terms, the appropriate focus under this approach is on any additional rights and restrictions that are not generally implied in a sales
context.405
Other commentators have suggested that insofar as most mass
market software license agreements are contracts of adhesion, restric398. See id. at 1361–62 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 109).
399. See id. at 1362.
400. NIMMER, supra note 287, § 8.08[B][1], at 8-125 n.39.10g.
401. See id. at 8-122.8 to 8-125.
402. Id. at 8-125 n.39.10f (quoting David Nimmer, Brains and Other Paraphernalia of
the Digital Age, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 22 (1996)); cf. Determann & Fellmeth, supra
note 385, at 41 (“[T]he transfer of perpetual user rights characterize a ‘sale’ of a copy of
software.”).
403. See id. at 41–42.
404. Id.
405. See id.
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tive mass market license terms should generally be viewed with skepticism, particularly when they purport to deprive the licensee of protections provided by the federal copyright laws.406 Such perspectives
are part of an extensive ongoing debate over the enforceability and
federal preemption of mass market, “shrinkwrap,” and “clickwrap”
license agreements.407
Developments since MAI have shown that, even though there remains considerable disagreement as to which rights constitute the sine
qua non of “ownership of a copy,” there is substantial agreement
among courts and commentators that the § 117 eligibility inquiry requires a particularized examination of the consumer’s rights under the
terms of a software license.408 For purposes of characterizing legal
and technological impediments to software use as restraints of trade in
antitrust analysis, it is sufficient to observe that under each of the
post-MAI interpretational approaches described here, the only way a
consumer of a software product can be legally disqualified from the
protections of § 117 is by entering into an enforceable agreement with
the vendor whose terms operate to remove some or all of those protections.409 In other words, nothing in the Copyright Act operates to impede a consumer from creating copies and adaptations of a computer
program that are essential to enable its use for the purposes contemplated by the vendor and consumer. Any such impediments are, therefore, either contractual or technological in nature.

406. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Contract Principles as a Guide for Protecting Intellectual Property Rights in Computer Software, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 105, 112, 149–51
(1986); Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 511, 531–33 (1996–97).
407. See supra note 248.
408. See supra text accompanying notes 389–407.
409. Notably, § 117 is an affirmative defense. Thus, even if a defendant is fully entitled
to the protections of § 117, the burden remains on the defendant to prove its applicability.
See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litigat., 964 F. Supp. 1469, 1474 (D. Kan. 1997);
Allen-Myland v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 746 F. Supp. 520, 535–36 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Atari,
Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 5, 10 (N.D.Ill. 1983); see also Am. Int'l Pictures,
Inc. v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661, 665 (5th Cir. 1978) (“[B]ecause copyright law favors the
rights of the copyright holder, the person claiming authority to copy or vend generally must
show that his authority to do so flows from the copyright holder.”).
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b. Loading Produces an “Adaptation”
CONTU’s final report,410 as well as many courts411 and commentators,412 treated the loading of software code into RAM as being synonymous with copying the code there. However, in most modern
computer systems the loading of software code into RAM requires the
creation not only of a “cop[y],” implicating the reproduction right of
§ 106, but also of one or more “adaptations” within the meaning of
§ 117. Whereas “‘copy’ and ‘copying’ are defined by the [Copyright]
Act, [and] not by . . . [computer] industry usage,”413 “loading” is a
term of art in the computer industry. Thus, the existence of a discrepancy between the concepts of loading and copying is not surprising,
but it is significant. Since the use of a software product entails the
loading of software code into RAM, this analysis will imply that the
scope of the § 117 adaptation exemption plays a more important role
in defining the legal rights that constitute a software product than has
been previously appreciated.
To see why “loading” implicates the § 117 adaptation exemption,
it is first necessary to have a basic understanding of the concept of a
“process,” which represents the operational context in which software
code is loaded into RAM. 414 A process may be described informally
as an active computation, or defined more formally as a dynamic entity that executes code and processes data using computer system resources.415 Processes are the entities responsible for generating all of
the behavior of a computer system when it executes software.416

410. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 372, at 31 (“the placement of a [copyrighted] work
into a computer is the preparation of a copy”).
411. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 1988)
(“[T]he act of loading a program from a medium of storage into a computer’s memory constitutes a copy of the program . . . .”); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d
511, 517–19 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing applicability of § 117 to “copies” made by loading
software into RAM, but not to “adaptations”); Allen-Myland, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs.
Corp., 746 F. Supp. 520, 536 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (citation omitted) (stating that § 117 “permits
only the copying of a program into a computer’s memory in order to permit the computer to
execute the program”).
412. See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of
Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1256–57 (2001) (“In order to run a software program, a computer must copy portions of that software from the disk or other medium on which it is stored into the computer's RAM.”); John E. Titus, Comment, Right to
Reverse Engineer Software: Is Japan Next and Does It Really Matter?, 19 N.C. J. INT’L L.
& COM. REG. 491, 497 n.44 (1994) (“[F]or the purchaser of software to run it on a computer, he must make a copy of it in the computer's random access memory (RAM).”).
413. Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 364
(E.D. Va. 1994).
414. See GARY NUTT, OPERATING SYSTEMS: A MODERN PERSPECTIVE 38 (2002).
415. See id.
416. See id. at 50 (“Processes are the fundamental schedulable unit of computation representing the execution of a program . . . . A process has a program to define its behavior,
resources that are used to carry out the execution, and data on which to operate.”).
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In modern computer systems, the RAM and other system resources are allocated to the various processes that are running on the
system.417 Each process consists of code to be executed, data to be
processed, system resources to be utilized during the computation, and
a “process descriptor” that keeps track of the process’s exact status,
including its progress through the computation.418 Each process has an
“address space” that assigns a unique identifier, or “address,” to each
system resource (e.g., memory location, operating system service, file,
mailbox or other object) to which it has access.419 Wherever the code
makes reference to an address within the process’s address space, a
process executing the code uses the system resource corresponding to
that address.420 Although each process’ address space is used only by
that process, system resources may be shared among several processes
by being represented in each such process’ address space.
To draw upon a commonly-used analogy from the culinary
world,421 if code is like a recipe, then a process is like a chef working
in a designated space, during a designated time period, in a common
kitchen. Within the chef’s workspace are the ingredients (data) and
utensils (system resources) to be used in executing the recipe (code).
At any given point in time, the chef is aware of the status of all of his
or her own work in progress and, if queried, can provide a precise
A process is an abstraction that represents “a coherent sequence of steps undertaken by a
program,” see MICROSOFT CORP., supra note 164, at 359 (1999), and that comes into existence only at runtime, when the software code has been linked together and loaded into
memory. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 50 (D.D.C. 1999) (“The
user who launches a program, however, is ultimately responsible for causing routines to be
loaded into memory and executed together to produce the program’s overall functionality.”); id. at 55 (“For software code to provide any functionalities at all the code must be
loaded into the computer's dynamic memory and executed.”). Thus, to the extent that antitrust analysis may need to be grounded in an intuitive description of the “technological
components” that constitute a software product, see United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34, 81–82 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (criticizing plaintiffs’ failure to identify “what are the technological components of . . . a browser”), a software product may be said to consist of the
processes that are created pursuant to the user’s legal rights when the product is used (as
opposed to, for example, the lines of code in the accompanying software).
417. See id. at 164.
418. See FREE ON-LINE DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING, supra note 169 (defining “process”); NUTT, supra note 414, at 170–71 (describing the “process descriptor”).
419. See id. at 166–67.
420. See id. at 167.
421. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 704 (2d Cir.
1992) (stating that computer programs are more closely similar to a utilitarian “recipe for
scrambled eggs” than a creative “narration of Humpty Dumpty’s demise”); Bernstein v.
U.S. Dept. of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1435 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (analogizing software to
recipes and other “purely functional” forms of speech protected under the First Amendment); WILLIAM H. PRESS ET AL., NUMERICAL RECIPES IN C: THE ART OF SCIENTIFIC
COMPUTING (1993); Michael S. Bendel, Comment, An Analysis That Is Not “Ad Hoc”: The
Bifurcated Uniform Analysis That the Federal Courts Should Follow to Determine Computer Program Copyright Nonliteral Infringement, 12 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO.
L. 485, 489 n.19 (“[T]hink of the computer program as a recipe for baking bread.”). The
recipe/cooking analogy is obviously imprecise. It is used here for expository purposes only
and is not intended to lend any analytical support to the author’s argument.
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description of this status (process descriptor). Although the concept of
an address space does not have an exact counterpart in the kitchen, it
is possible to think of the chef as having a mental directory that translates each of the abstract terms in a recipe (e.g., “whisk”) to the concrete utensils in the kitchen (e.g., “the copper egg whisk”), and
consulting this directory while executing the recipe. Such a mental
directory would play the same role as a process’s address space. Although each chef has his or her own mental directory, multiple chefs
can have the same copper egg whisk in mind when they read the word
“whisk” in a recipe.
Just as a chef can consult (and thereby place into his or her own
mental directory) a recipe book in another chef’s workspace, in most
computer systems a process can assign to its address space code that
has already been assigned to another process’s address space.422 Also,
a chef can work concurrently on multiple recipes, or multiple batches
of the same recipe, all of which may be at varying stages of progress
at any given time. Similarly, in most computer systems, a process can
concurrently execute different sequences of code, or multiple instances of the same sequence of code, all of which may be at different
stages of progress at any given time.423 The process descriptor typically holds status information that tracks each of these concurrent
computations, or “threads,” as it progresses through its sequence of
code.424
Code must be loaded into RAM in such a way that it appears
within the address space of each process that needs to access and execute it. To accomplish this, the computer system performs the following actions.
First, the operating system allocates areas of RAM to the various
processes, so that each process has a group of addresses in its address
space that are assigned to specific physical locations in RAM.425
Next, the code that each process needs to execute is translated, or
“linked,” from the form in which it is stored on the hard drive into its
final executable form.426 In modern computer systems, linking often
results in extensive modifications to the code,427 which are too complex to describe in detail here. Linking serves in part to adjust the
code to reflect the actual RAM locations where the code has been assigned to be loaded.428 When a program is built from subprograms
422. See LEVINE, supra note 170, at 187–227 (discussing shared code libraries).
423. See FREE ON-LINE DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING, supra note 169 (defining “multithreading”).
424. See id.
425. See NUTT, supra note 414, at 335.
426. See id. at 168.
427. See LEVINE, supra note 170, at 10 (“Modern computers . . . require considerably
more complex code modification . . . . [T]he compiler and linker have to use complicated
addressing tricks to handle data at arbitrary addresses.”).
428. Id. at 5 (describing “relocation”).
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that are stored separately on the hard drive (e.g., in shared program
libraries such as Windows DLL files), linking also serves to adjust
any cross-references between the subprograms by identifying the
RAM location of the referenced code and altering the referencing
code so that it refers to that RAM location.429
Finally, the linked code is loaded into available blocks in RAM
that correspond to locations within the process’s address space.430
Linking and loading are usually performed by specialized computer programs known as “linkers” and “loaders,” respectively.431
Because linking and loading serve as the final means by which code is
adapted to the machine environment in which it is to be executed,
linkers and loaders must be “exquisitely sensitive to the architectural
details, both the hardware architecture and the architecture conventions required by the operating system of their target computers.”432
The legislative history of § 117,433 as well as the plain meaning of
the word “adaptation,”434 provide strong support for the conclusion
that loading software into RAM creates an “adaptation” of that software within the meaning of the statute. Linked and loaded code that
has been “fixed” in RAM is most accurately described, in CONTU’s
words, as a version that has been “adapt[ed] . . . to that limited extent
which will allow its use in the possessor’s computer” in order to accommodate the “lack of complete standardization among programming languages and hardware in the computer industry.”435
As a general matter, adaptations of copyrighted works may implicate the copyright owner’s exclusive right to reproduce the work in
copies.436 To the extent that software loaded into RAM is substantially
similar to copyrighted software so as to constitute a “copy” under
§ 106, it is appropriate, given CONTU’s intent,437 to continue the present practice of construing § 117 as immunizing “owners of a copy”
who load software into RAM from liability for infringement of repro-

429. Id. (describing “symbol resolution”).
430. See NUTT, supra note 414, at 168.
431. See LEVINE, supra note 170, at 5 (“Although there’s considerable overlap between
linking and loading, it’s reasonable to define a program that does program loading as a
loader, and one that does symbol resolution as a linker. Either can do relocation, and there
have been all-in-one linking loaders that do all three functions.”).
432. Id. at 19.
433. See supra notes 377–380 and accompanying text.
434. See WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 55 (1990) (defining “adaptation” as “adjustment to environmental conditions”).
435. See supra note 372.
436. See NIMMER, supra note 287, § 8.09[A], at 8-138 (“[I]f the right to make derivative
works, i.e., the adaptation right, has been infringed, then there is necessarily also an infringement of either the reproduction or performance rights.”).
437. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 372, at 30 (stating that protection under § 117
should provide “a legal right to copy [software] to that extent which will permit its use by
that possessor”).
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duction rights.438 Since we have seen that software loaded into RAM
is not merely a “copy,” but also an “adaptation,” the § 117 adaptation
exemption should be recognized as an integral part of the bundle of
rights that constitute a software product.
c. Rights in End Uses of a Software Product
A consumer may face considerable uncertainty in determining the
applicability of the § 117 adaptation exemption to a particular use of
copyrighted software. Since the exemption is a personal right,439 its
application may call for a fact-specific inquiry.440 Also, some courts
have read the exemption broadly to include uses other than those intended by the copyright owner,441 while others have stressed the exemption’s limitations.442 It is clear that § 117 does not vitiate all use
limitations in software licenses.443 It is also clear, however, that at a
minimum the exemption includes any adaptations that are “necessary
to allow use of the program for the purpose for which it was purchased.”444

438. See supra note 411.
439. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(b) (2004) (“Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only
with the authorization of the copyright owner.”).
440. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 372, at 32 (“These [adaptation] rights would necessarily be more private in nature than the right to load a program by copying it and could
only be exercised so long as they did not harm the interests of the copyright proprietor.”).
441. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Section
117(1) contains no language to suggest that the copy it permits must be employed for a use
intended by the copyright owner, and, absent clear congressional guidance to the contrary,
we refuse to read such limiting language into this exception.”); see also Christian H. Nadan,
A Proposal to Recognize Component Works: How a Teddy Bears on the Competing Ends of
Copyright Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1633, 1659 (1990) (“The term ‘essential’ in the statute
likely means essential to the buyer's utilization of the program. The buyer's desires should
be the issue, and not the intention of the seller of the program.”).
442. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that defendant’s use “went far beyond” that authorized by § 117, but declining to decide
whether § 117 “protects only the use intended by the copyright owner”); Micro-Sparc, Inc.
v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D. Mass. 1984) (holding that an owner of a printed
copy of software code is not permitted under § 117 to authorize a third-party typing service
to make a machine-readable disk copy); see also Steven Kyle Tapp & Daniel E. Wanat,
Computer Software Copyright Issues: Section 117 and Fair Use, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV.
197, 213 & n.220 (1992) (noting that in Vault, the requirement that the copy or adaptation
be created “as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction
with a machine and that it is used in no other manner” just as easily could have been read to
prohibit copying for uses contrary to those intended by the copyright owner).
443. See, e.g., Sega, 977 F.2d at 1520; Expediters Int’l of Wash., Inc. v. Direct Line
Cargo Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 995 F. Supp. 468, 478–79 (D.N.J. 1998) (finding that the defendant’s use of copyrighted software beyond the scope of the license agreement’s express use
limitations did not fall within the § 117 exemptions); see also CONTU REPORT, supra note
372, at 33 (noting that software vendors who do not want their programs modified to support additional user purposes “could, of course, make such desires a contractual matter”).
444. RAV Communications, Inc. v. Philipp Bros., Inc., 1988 WL 36174 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
13, 1988), at *2–*3; accord, Aymes v. Bonelli, 47 F.3d 23, 25–27 (2d Cir. 1995).
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The clarity of the § 117 safe harbor for the use of a software
product for a consumer purpose “for which it was both sold and purchased,” when contrasted with the unsettled status of other end uses,
provides a basis for legally significant distinctions among the bundles
of rights that permit the respective end uses of a software product. For
example, consider a software product with two non-interchangeable
end uses A and B. A vendor could offer the product under a license
restricting the consumer to end use A only. Under the license terms
and the § 117 adaptation exemption, the consumer would have a clear
right to link, load and execute the accompanying software while using
the product for end use A (the purpose for which it was purchased),
but would face uncertainty as to the legality of using the product for
end use B, even though there might be no technological impediment
to doing so. While a distinction between clear and unclear legal authorization under the Copyright Act might not seem to be an intuitive
approach to constituting a product for the mass market, this is essentially the same distinction that the vendors of all copyrighted works
offer to consumers in urging them to purchase authorized copies of
their works instead of making their own unauthorized copies and relying on the uncertain, fact-specific applicability of the fair use doctrine.
d. Significance of the Adaptation Exemption
As part of the default allocation of rights provided by the Copyright Act,445 the § 117 adaptation exemption is an essential element of
the paradigmatic software product contemplated by CONTU446 and,
by implication, Congress.447 Within this framework, a software product consists essentially of technological access to the accompanying
software through the ownership of a copy, together with legal immunity from copyright liability for acts of copying and adaptation in the
due course of installing and running the software on a system according to the documentation.448
Although some software products may be licensed under enforceable agreements that waive the consumer’s rights under § 117, both
CONTU and the courts have recognized that for a consumer to use a
software product for the purpose “for which it was both sold and purchased,” a legal entitlement to adapt the software “to that limited ex445. See, e.g., Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 206 F.3d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that
the Copyright Act’s “default allocation and presumption of rights” applies where authors
and publishers have not contracted around the statutory framework), aff’d, 533 U.S. 483
(2001).
446. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 372, at 33 (“[I]t is likely that many transactions
involving copies of programs are entered into with full awareness that users will modify
their copies to suit their own needs, and this should be reflected in the law.”).
447. See supra notes 377–380 and accompanying text.
448. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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tent which will allow its use in the possessor’s computer” is often
necessary and expected as a practical matter.449 As the Second Circuit
has explained, “Buyers should be able to adapt a purchased program
for use on the buyer’s computer because without modifications, the
program may work improperly, if at all. No buyer would pay for a
program without such a right.”450
Beyond this, the foregoing analysis demonstrates that the § 117
adaptation exemption is practically necessary under far more general
conditions than has been previously appreciated. While the CONTU
Report cites the “conversion of a program from one higher-level language to another” and the “add[ition of] features” to a program as
examples of exempted software adaptations,451 we have seen that the
mere loading of software into RAM prior to executing it also constitutes a § 117 adaptation.
The § 117 adaptation exemption serves alongside the Computer
Associates filter452 to ensure a well-functioning software product market, inasmuch as it guarantees that the consumer of a software product
will be able to enjoy the benefit of the bargain — i.e., the ability to
link, load, and execute the same code that the vendor chose to implement the product’s intended purposes.453 To impede competing software developers from determining which code is to be executed when
consumers choose to use their products is to frustrate the Copyright
Act’s scheme for guaranteeing consumers the right to use every software product for the purpose “for which it was both sold and purchased.” There is no warrant in the Copyright Act for the imposition
of such a restraint.
C. Summary
The principles of copyright law and computer science discussed
in this section can be summarized by reference to the detailed software-product definition that was described earlier:454
A software product is defined by reference to accompanying software and documentation, and consists essentially of the necessary legal rights, and
technological capabilities, to install and run the
449. CONTU REPORT, supra note 372, at 32.
450. Aymes v. Bonelli, 47 F.3d 23, 26–27 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting CONTU REPORT, supra note 372, at 32). Although the citation is to the CONTU Report, the quotation actually
appears to be taken from Robert A. Kreiss, Section 117 of the Copyright Act, 1991 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 1497, 1518–19 (1991), which further states that “reasonable sellers who want to
make a sale will readily agree to all the adaptations.” Id. at 1519.
451. CONTU REPORT, supra note 372, at 33.
452. See supra Part III.A.2.
453. See supra Part II.E.
454. See supra text accompanying note 165.
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software on a system according to the documentation; it does not include any of the software code or
documentation.
The necessary legal rights consist essentially of a
limited, nonexclusive license to make copies and adaptations of the software code on a computer’s hard
drive and in the computer’s memory during the
course of using the software product for the consumer purpose(s) for which it was sold and purchased. These rights are granted to the consumer by
express contractual provisions (for example, by the
terms of a software license agreement) and, where
the consumer is an “owner of a copy” of the software, by the statutory adaptation exemption of § 117.
The necessary technological capabilities refer essentially to an end user’s ability, by installing and running the software on a system according to the
documentation, to cause the creation of processes in
RAM that generate system behavior for supporting
the consumer purpose(s) for which the software
product was sold and purchased.

IV. APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This Article has had two goals in mind in introducing new concepts and approaches for defining software products and the markets
in which they compete: enhancing the factual accuracy and legal sufficiency of the resulting analysis and supporting innovation driven by
competition in well-functioning markets. In the following concluding
discussion, this Article will indicate how these goals may be achieved
in practice through the adjudicative process.
A. Syncsort v. Sequential
A recent case, Syncsort Inc. v. Sequential Software, Inc., illustrates the application of the first principles approach to the definition
of software products and the markets in which they compete. 455 Syncsort, a vendor of a popular software product for sorting large data sets,
sued Sequential, a small competitor, for misappropriation of trade
secrets.456 Sequential answered with a counterclaim alleging that
Syncsort had engaged in various tactics “to monopolize and maintain
455. 50 F. Supp. 2d 318 (D.N.J. 1999).
456. Id. at 321–23.

74

Harvard Journal of Law & Technology

[Vol. 18

its monopoly of the UNIX [s]orting [m]arket” in violation of § 2 of
the Sherman Act.457 Sequential also alleged that the UNIX sorting
market “consists of primarily three competitors: Syncsort, Innovative
Routines International, Inc. and IBM,”458 and that Syncsort’s position
in this market “has allowed it to create an industry standard command
structure for using computer sort programs on UNIX operating systems.”459
Syncsort moved for judgment on the pleadings with respect to
Sequential’s antitrust counterclaim.460 Noting that Sequential had the
burden of defining the relevant product market in its pleadings,461 the
district court described Sequential’s proposed market definition as
“impermissibly narrow.”462 In particular, Sequential gave no reason
for excluding certain other “programs which perform sorting operations under the UNIX operating system, including Ahlsort, Aps Sort,
Nsort, NitroSort and OT Sort,”463 or for restricting the market to
UNIX-based sorting programs rather than “the broader sorting market
comprised of all programs which perform sorting operations or operations equivalent to sorting outside of the UNIX operating system.”464
Citing Queen City Pizza,465 a widely followed Third Circuit case, the
court held that “[t]he failure of Sequential to define the market in
terms of reasonable interchangeability or explain the rationale underlying its narrow proposed market definition is, in itself, grounds for
dismissal.”466 Accordingly, the court dismissed Sequential’s antitrust
counterclaim.467
The facts presented in the district court’s opinion do not provide
all of the information necessary to define a relevant product market
using this Article’s first principles approach. By applying the product
market definition procedure in Part II.D to the facts of the case and to
publicly available technical information about some of the products at
issue, however, it is possible to establish that many, but not all, of the
district court’s objections to Sequential’s proposed product market
definition were warranted.

457. Id. at 326–27.
458. Id. at 331.
459. Id. at 330.
460. Id. at 322 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c)).
461. Id. at 331 (citing Schuylkill Energy Res., Inc. v. Penn. Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d
405, 415 (1997)).
462. Id.
463. Id. at 332.
464. Id. at 332–33.
465. Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1997).
466. Syncsort, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 333.
467. See id. at 340.
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1. The Defendant’s Product
Syncsort markets Syncsort/UNIX as a software product defined
by reference to accompanying software and documentation, consisting
essentially of sufficient legal rights and technological capabilities to
install and run the software on a UNIX system.468
2. Relevant Consumer Purposes
Syncsort describes Syncsort/UNIX as a “full-function, highperformance sort product for UNIX systems.”469 While Syncsort/UNIX may be used for various consumer purposes,470 two appear
to be relevant to the practices Sequential challenged. First, Syncsort/UNIX enables a user to perform the task of sorting a data file.471
Second, by providing “an industry standard command line structure”
that can be invoked by COBOL, UNIX, and other applications,472
Syncsort/UNIX may be valued for its accompanying platform software, which must be preinstalled as a precondition to running such
applications.
Sequential’s suggestion that Syncsort has the power to create and
impose the sort command structure of its choice on the industry seems
dubious, since Syncsort has positioned Syncsort/UNIX as a product
that is compatible with standard COBOL and UNIX sort commands.473 Even if this were the case the end use of Syncsort/UNIX as
platform software would not be susceptible to quality-adjusted price
discrimination, because any diminution in quality with respect to that
use would also adversely affect Syncsort/UNIX’s ability to perform
sorting tasks through the UNIX command line interface.474 Similarly,
the end use of Syncsort/UNIX for performing sorting tasks could not
468. Syncsort, Inc., Sorting Software for UNIX Systems, at http://www.syncsort.com/
infosu.htm(last visited Dec. 4, 2004).
469. See id.
470. See id. (noting that “SyncSort provides a full set of data manipulation functions,”
including record selection, reformatting, join, summarization, and multiple output).
471. See id. (“Specifically designed for sorting and data manipulation in commercial
UNIX environments, SyncSort provides a combination of speed, efficiency, the ability to
handle a variety of data and file types, and versatile data manipulation features.”); Paul
Boal, Syncsort Application Guidelines, at 9, at http://www.apo49.org/~pboal/papers/ (last
visited Dec. 4, 2004) (“By its name, SyncSort’s strong suit is sorting data files.”).
472. See id. (describing “[i]nvoking SyncSort with a pre-written script”); Syncsort, Inc v.
Sequential Software, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 318 (D.N.J. 1999) (“COBOL applications frequently use flat or indexed files, which require a great deal of sorting. SyncSort makes these
sorts run faster whether they are hidden inside programs using the COBOL SORT verb or
are done in shell scripts using the UNIX sort command.”).
473. See id. (describing Syncsort’s Micro Focus COBOL Sort Accelerator and MVS or
VSE to UNIX Sort Converters).
474. See, e.g., KAARE CHRISTIAN, THE UNIX OPERATING SYSTEM 27–42 (1983) (explaining that the UNIX system shell permits commands to be typed at the terminal or executed
within programs by background and/or foreground processes).
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be targeted for quality-adjusted price discrimination. Therefore, the
relevant product market definition should be based on both consumer
purposes together, rather than either one taken separately.
3. Represent Any Relevant Tasks as Essential Use Cases
The basic command structure for making a call to Syncsort/UNIX
to perform the task of sorting a file is illustrated by Figure 3.475
Figure 3: Command Structure to Sort a File in Syncsort/UNIX
$ syncsort << EOF
01> /INFILE /temp/sorted_by_id.dat FIXED 30
02> /FIELDS id 1 CHARACTER 5,
03> val 5 CHARACTER 25
04> /KEYS val
05> /REFORMAT val, id
06> /OUTFILE /temp/sorted_by_name.dat
07> EOF

In this example, command 01 specifies the input file, commands 02
and 03 define the layout of the fixed-width input file, command 04
specifies the sorting criterion by identifying the field “val” as the key
to sort on, command 05 starts the sorting routine, and command 06
specifies the output file.
As a specification of the sorting task, this example is far too particularized and concrete (not to mention technical) to be useful in a
reasonable interchangeability inquiry. However, the same user-system
interaction can readily be expressed in a simplified, generalized, abstract, technology-free, and implementation-independent form as
shown in the essential use case in Figure 4.

475. See Boal, supra note 471, at 9.
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Figure 4: Essential Use Case for Sorting a File According to a Desired
Sort Criterion
sort file
User Intention

System Responsibility

choose file to be sorted
choose sort criterion
start sorting
input file to be sorted
sort file according to sort criterion
output sorted file
receive sorted file

4. Identify Products That Are Functionally Interchangeable with the
Defendant’s Product for the Relevant Consumer Purposes
A reasonable interchangeability analysis of all of the software
products mentioned in the case is beyond the scope of this Article.476
For illustration, however, this Article will consider whether one of
these products is functionally and reasonably interchangeable with
Syncsort/UNIX for the relevant consumer purposes.
According to the Nsort User Guide,477 Nsort can “sort data sets
quickly” according to a wide range of sort criteria.478 Specifically,
Nsort responds to a command line whereby a user can choose, inter
alia, the file to be sorted and the sort criterion.479
Nsort therefore supports the essential use case in Figure 4, and is
functionally interchangeable with Syncsort/UNIX for the purpose of
supporting the task of sorting files.
The manual does not mention COBOL compatibility, but does
state that Nsort can “[a]ccept command lines for the POSIX sort utility included with most UNIX implementations.”480 Accordingly,
Nsort may be deemed functionally interchangeable with Syncsort/UNIX for the purpose of preinstalling platform software for

476. See, e.g., text accompanying note 463.
477. ORDINAL TECHNOLOGY, NSORT USER GUIDE: RELEASE 3.2 (May 17, 2002), available at http://www.ordinal.com/NsortUserGuide.pdf.
478. Id. at 3.
479. Id. at 19.
480. Id. at 3.
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UNIX programs that utilize the UNIX/POSIX command line structure.
5. List Relevant Competitive Variables
The marketing literature for Syncsort and Nsort identifies high
speed and high capacity as the most salient performance metrics in
their competition with other software products.481 Other cited performance metrics include “efficiency, the ability to handle a variety of
data and file types, and . . . a variety of [data manipulation] functions
such as selecting, joining, grouping and extracting.”482
Other competitive variables are highlighted by the compatibility
differences between Syncsort/UNIX and Nsort. By supporting standard COBOL and UNIX sort commands, Syncsort/UNIX offers
greater versatility for the purpose of preinstalling platform software
than does Nsort, which appears to support only UNIX programs that
use the UNIX/POSIX command line structure. Depending on user
preferences among the various command line structures, this difference may also be material with respect to the end use of Syncsort/UNIX and Nsort to perform the task of sorting files.
Finally, both Syncsort/UNIX and Nsort require as a precondition
that the UNIX operating system software be preinstalled on the system. Nsort further requires that the UNIX installation include support
for the POSIX sort utility. This difference in preconditions may be
material and should be considered as a possibly relevant competitive
variable.
6. Identify Products That Are Reasonably Interchangeable with the
Defendant’s Product for the Relevant Consumer Purposes
Even though detailed information is not available regarding the
demand response to the various competitive variables identified, there
does not seem to be any clear error in the district court’s conclusion
that Sequential needed to justify the exclusion of Nsort from the relevant market in which Syncsort/UNIX competes. Speed and capacity
differences would presumably serve to locate these two functionally
interchangeable products along a continuous spectrum of price/quality
481. Ordinal Technology, Nsort: the Choice for Sorting Very Large Data Sets, at
http://www.ordinal.com/Nsort.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2004) (“Nsort is a high-speed, highcapacity sort program that supports timely processing of today’s large data sets. As corporate databases continue to grow, the ability to process them quickly to gain business insight
is a critical competitive advantage.”); Syncsort, Inc., SyncSort UNIX Product Description,
at http://www.syncsort.com/sort/infosu.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2004) (providing a “performance comparison” of elapsed and CPU time between Syncsort and other methods of
sorting data).
482. See Syncsort, Inc v. Sequential Software, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 318 (D.N.J. 1999).
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choices for consumers.483 Both Syncsort/UNIX and Nsort offer considerable flexibility in handling a variety of file and data types and
performing a variety of data manipulation functions, and there is nothing to suggest the existence of any product features unique to either
product that could give rise to a group of captive buyers. Finally, the
differences between the two products’ preconditions for use are
probably minor and certainly narrowing. The POSIX sort utility is
already included on most UNIX installations, and is increasingly being adopted as an “industry standard UNIX implementation.”484 In
contrast, COBOL is increasingly being seen as an antiquated programming language.485
The precondition that the UNIX operating system software be
preinstalled on the system, on the other hand, is much more material
with respect to consumer preferences between UNIX-based and nonUNIX-based software products. The use of a non-UNIX-based software product requires as a precondition that some other operating system software be preinstalled on the system. Because of the difficulty
of porting applications software from one operating system to another486 and the relative scarcity of “dual boot” systems on which
multiple operating systems have been installed,487 it is unlikely that
many consumers would respond to a quality-adjusted price increase
by a hypothetical monopolist of UNIX-based sorting software products by switching to non-UNIX-based products.
7. Identify Structural Barriers to Entry
Sequential’s only apparent claim of a structural barrier to entry
was in its suggestion that Syncsort has the power to create and impose
the sort command structure of its choice on the industry. As explained
above, this claim seems dubious.
483. See supra text accompanying note 85.
484. See, e.g., CARL Corp. v. Dep’t of Educ., 946 P.2d 1, 13 (Haw. 1997).
485. See, e.g., Michael Daly, City’s $1B Pain in the Assessment, N.Y. Daily News, May
14, 2003, at 6 (describing a letter alleging that New York City property tax assessor’s office
“uses programs written in antiquated COBOL”); Andrew Kukielka, Comment: The Millstone of Mainframes, BANKING TECH., Feb. 23, 2004, at 38 (noting that financial institutions have traditionally relied on “1970s technology and antiquated programming languages
such as Cobol”). But see Tim McKenna, COBOL, RPG Not Going Away, COMPUTING
CANADA, Nov. 16, 2001 (“COBOL is taught at many institutions, but its champions are
retiring . . . . Remember how hot COBOL and RPG programmers were between 1996 and
Dec. 31, 1999? It will happen again, albeit less dramatically, when those grey haired programmers retire.”).
486. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 18 (D.D.C. 1999)
(finding that “the porting of applications from one operating system to another is a costly
process”).
487. See, e.g., James Coates, Kissing Blue Screen of Death Goodbye Leaves User Seeing
Red, Chi. Trib., Sept. 21, 2003, at 4 (describing dual boot installations as “too much of a
hassle for most” users).
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To summarize, this Article’s first principles approach to product
market definition in Syncsort indicates that Sequential’s exclusion of
non-UNIX-based software products from its proposed market was
most likely correct, as was its more general argument that “the market
is clearly segregated by operating systems.”488 On the other hand, Sequential improperly failed to explain its exclusion of other UNIXbased sorting software products from the proposed relevant market, at
least with respect to Nsort. The district court was therefore correct in
dismissing Sequential’s antitrust counterclaim.
B. The Peer-to-Peer Controversy
The pursuit of well-functioning software product markets implies
that where a court states a legal rule that has the effect of regulating
the use of software products, it should try to do so without prescribing
any particular software design solution. The ongoing controversy over
the use of peer-to-peer network (“P2P”) software products to trade
copyrighted files over the Internet illustrates one potential application
of this principle.
In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.489 and Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,490 two courts in the Ninth Circuit adjudicated claims of contributory copyright infringement against
vendors who developed and distributed these P2P software products.
Both of the software products at issue, Napster and Grokster, supported the same two user purposes: “downloading,” by enabling a user
to search for and retrieve files that have been designated as shared on
another user’s system, and “uploading,” by enabling a user to designate which files are to be shared and serving search and retrieval requests from other users, as indicated in the essential use cases in
Figure 5.491
As the Grokster court noted, there was a “critical distinction” between the ways Napster and Grokster implemented these functionalities.492 Napster’s servers “indexed files from, and passed search
queries and results among, all Napster users.”493 Grokster, on the
other hand, did not operate any “supernode” on the network or play
any part in the relaying of information across the network of Grokster
users.494 The court noted that “[u]sers connect to the [network], select
which files to share, send and receive searches, and download files, all
with no material involvement of [Grokster]. If [Grokster] closed [its]
488. Syncsort, Inc v. Sequential Software, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 318, 333 (D.N.J. 1999).
489. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
490. 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
491. See id. at 1032–33.
492. See id. at 1040.
493. See id.
494. See id. at 1039–40.
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doors and deactivated all computers within [its] control, users of [its]
products could continue sharing files with little or no interruption.”495
Thus, while the Ninth Circuit had previously upheld the grant of a
preliminary injunction barring Napster from engaging in or facilitating the unauthorized trading of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted works,496
the District Court for the Central District of California declined to
enjoin Grokster. Holding that no contributory infringement could be
found “[a]bsent evidence of active and substantial contribution to the
infringement itself,” the district court concluded that Grokster’s provision of P2P software did not constitute contributory infringement.497
Figure 5: Essential Use Cases for Downloading From and Uploading
to a P2P Network
download file
User Intention

System Responsibility

search for file
find shared file on another user’s
system
retrieve file
request file
receive file
upload file
User Intention

System Responsibility

share file

[continue while connected]
respond to other users’ search and
retrieval requests for this file

If the prevailing doctrine concerning the scope of copyright protection in software promotes antitrust policy by ensuring a wellfunctioning software product market,498 the contrasting results of
Napster and Grokster place the doctrine of contributory infringement
in tension with that policy.
Using first principles, it is clear that Napster and Grokster are
competing products. In a well-functioning software product market,
developers of these and other P2P software products would engage in
495. Id. at 1041.
496. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011.
497. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.
498. See supra text accompanying notes 452–453.
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full and free competition with respect to user-oriented preference and
performance metrics, which would very likely include the user’s interest in minimizing the risk of incurring direct copyright liability.499
After Napster and Grokster, however, a software developer’s design
choice must also take into account a cost that is not reflected among
any user’s preference and performance metrics: namely, the cost to
the vendor of the potential for contributory copyright liability. In implementing the essential use cases in Figure 5, a vendor will tend to
avoid designs that require the vendor to make an “active and substantial contribution” to file trading on the network, for reasons that are
independent of product quality.500 Thus, even if it happens to be the
case that the most usable P2P network for file trading requires a centralized indexing server, Grokster will have deterred the market from
producing such a design.
In reaching its conclusions, the Grokster court observed that “[i]n
a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly marked our course,
we must be circumspect in construing the scope of rights created by a
legislative enactment which never calculated such a calculus of interests.”501 If innovation driven by quality competition in a wellfunctioning software product market is cognizable as an interest in
this calculus,502 then courts in future contributory infringement cases
should reconsider the wisdom of analytical approaches that attach
liability to particular design choices. The determination of liability for
contributory infringement should instead be based on an analysis of
the infringing and non-infringing user purposes that are supported by
the defendant’s product.503
C. Human-centric Computing
While the foregoing case studies go some way toward illustrating
the breadth of application of the first principles approach, the ap499. In September 2003, the Recording Industry Association of America filed 261 lawsuits against individual users of P2P software products. See Peter K. Yu, The Copyright
Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 332 & n.6 (2003).
500. See supra note 497 and accompanying text.
501. 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.
502. See generally Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Stopping Digital Copyright Infringement Without Stopping Innovation (2003) (draft presented at Telecommunications
Policy Research Conference, 2004) (examining current and proposed copyright policies
regarding P2P networks with the objectives of stopping the deterrence of P2P innovators
and permitting cost-effective copyright enforcement in the digital environment), at
http://tprc.org/papers/2003/210/Stopping_Copyright_Infringement_Without_Stopping_Inno
vation.htm.
503. Cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984)
(holding that “the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce,
does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing
uses.”).
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proach can also bring clarity and rigor to much more analytically intensive questions, as this Article has demonstrated elsewhere in a detailed study of the Microsoft tying claim.504
In his final book, The Unfinished Revolution,505 the late MIT
computer scientist Michael Dertouzos predicted that “the first step
toward human-centric computing” will be the implementation of
“natural interaction with machines,” wherein “machine actions [will]
match our human intent” and where the system will “let us carry out
our intent at our level and with little effort.”506 The pursuit of wellfunctioning software product markets advocated in this Article may
advance Dertouzos’s vision of human-centric computing by setting in
motion a full and free competition to offer the software product that
most satisfactorily enables a system to fulfill its responsibilities in
response to a user’s intentions.
Design for human-centric computing is a worthwhile teleological
objective for the software industry, and one well suited to antitrust
jurisprudence. Despite the D.C. Circuit’s dicta regarding “the undesirability of having courts oversee product design”507 and of putting
“judges and juries in the unwelcome position of designing computers,”508 it is unlikely that the appeals court ever intended to extend
antitrust immunity to all business conduct that uses product design as
its instrumentality. As various commentators have observed, product
designs can be used to restrain trade just as effectively as contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies.509 Courts have explicitly condemned
at least those failures of product design that have given rise to legal
liability.510 By situating the evaluation of product design in a wellfunctioning software product market while recognizing usability metrics as objects of competition, antitrust courts can promote marketdriven advances in human-centric computing.

504. See Chin, supra note 41.
505. MICHAEL L. DERTOUZOS, THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (2001).
506. Id. at 20–24.
507. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
508. Id. at 950 (citing IX PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 1700j, at 15 (1991)).
509. See Lessig, supra note 27, at 27 (“To the extent that software manufacturers seek to
bundle software products, or software functionality, they can achieve that bundle either
through contract or through the design of the software itself . . . .”); cf. Rachel V. Leiterman,
Comment, Smart Companies, Foolish Choices? Product Designs that Harm Competitors,
15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 160–61 (1999) (“Some companies,
hiding behind the strong policy favoring innovation, have made changes to their products
that are at least as damaging to competitors as they are innovative.”).
510. See Leon E. Wein, Maladjusted Contrivances and Clumsy Automation: A Jurisprudential Investigation, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 375, 383 (1996).

